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thored by Professor Dr. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson.
The Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019, 
1st Edition, is published by the Secretariat of the Inter-
net & Jurisdiction Policy Network.
The author of this Report made a best effort to map 
the current ecosystem and trends based on desk-re-
search, as well as stakeholder surveys and interviews. 
The completeness of information can however not be 
guaranteed, as this Report constitutes a first global 
baseline on the state of jurisdiction on the internet. 
Moreover, the analysis of the author does not nec-
essarily reflect the view of the Secretariat of the In-
ternet & Jurisdiction Policy Network,  of stakeholders 
engaged in the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network, 
or of the financial supporters of the Report.
Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network - Paris, France
The Secretariat of the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy 
Network is grateful for the financial and institutional 
support of the following entities that have enabled the 
production of the Report:
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Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network (2019). Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019. 
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H ow to handle the coexistence of het-erogeneous laws on the cross- bor-der internet is one of the greatest 
policy challenges of the digital 21st century. 
Yet, scalable and coherent policy solutions 
cannot be developed without a comprehen-
sive understanding of a highly complex and 
dynamic ecosystem comprised of multiple 
actors, initiatives and trends across the pol-
icy silos of digital economy, human rights 
and security. This was a clear call by over 
200 key stakeholders from 40 countries at 
the 2nd Global Conference of the Internet & 
Jurisdiction Policy Network in 2018. Howev-
er, even decades after the rise of the com-
mercial internet, such consolidated data did 
not yet exist. To provide this indispensable 
mapping and analysis, the Secretariat of the 
Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network thus 
decided to launch the world’s first Internet 
& Jurisdiction Global Status Report. 
Drawing on the unique expertise of key 
stakeholders engaged in the policy devel-
opment work in the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Policy Network, this inaugural edition of the 
Global Status Report provides a first snap-
shot and baseline. It should be understood 
as a foundational dataset that will allow us 
to collectively proceed and fill in the gaps in 
future global and regional editions. For this 
ambitious and crucial endeavour, we invite 
all stakeholders to contribute their knowl-
edge and share their data. 
Clarifying how existing national laws apply 
in cyberspace and developing new balanced 
frameworks to address abuses, enable the 
digital economy and protect human rights 
will determine the shape of the emerging 
digital society for future generations. To 
preserve the open, cross-border nature 
of the internet, policy coherence and legal 
interoperability between multiple regimes 
need to be established. This requires com-
munication, coordination and, ultimately, 
cooperation among all stakeholders. 
Yet, sound policy-making must be based 
on evidence and reliable data. Policy co-
herence on a transnational basis can only 
be achieved through a shared understand-
ing of the issues at stake and awareness of 
the various initiatives. The availability of 
this comprehensive overview and analysis 
of trends and initiatives will translate the 
highly complex and often technical nature 
of substantive issues for decision makers. 
This Report represents the first step of an 
ongoing effort by the Secretariat of the 
Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network to 
make this essential information accessible 
to all stakeholders, to help them to collec-
tively address some of the most pressing 
global challenges of our times.
We are delighted that the inaugural Internet 
& Jurisdiction Global Status Report will be 
launched on the occasion of the 3rd Glob-
al Conference of the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Policy Network. We would like to express our 
gratitude to the pioneers of this new glob-
al effort to foster policy coherence through 
capacity building and evidence-based policy 
innovation: the stakeholders in the Internet 
& Jurisdiction Policy Network, the author, 
Professor Dan Svantesson, as well as Ger-
many, Denmark, Estonia and the European 
Commission, who are making this essential 
effort possible. 
BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE and PAUL FEHLINGER
Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director 
Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network  
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DR. MARIA FLACHSBARTH
Parliamentary State Secretary to the Federal Minister for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany
T he World Wide Web, the internet as most people know it, is just 30 years old. Within this short amount of time, the distinction between the online and of-
fline world has become meaningless. We are online every 
day. We use the internet to receive news. We communicate 
with family, friends and co-workers. Our homes and appli-
ances are connected through the Internet of Things.  We 
order business services and interact with local and national 
authorities. Our mobile phones and laptops make for easy 
internet access at home or on the go. 
The internet increased global connectivity, advanced our 
societies and economies, and still offers tremendous oppor-
tunities. However, we must not forget that almost half the 
world’s population has no access to the internet. Particu-
larly women are facing inequalities with regard to access 
to internet and participation in the IT sector. The internet’s 
potential still needs to be unlocked in remote areas and less 
developed countries. This is a task of utmost importance, 
and we need to keep it in mind when talking about the in-
ternet’s future and evolution. Also, not all countries and 
stakeholders have been able to contribute equally to dis-
cussions about internet jurisdiction and regulation.
The internet established some new challenges, too. Free 
speech needs to be protected online and we have to find 
ways to deal with hate speech, manipulation and misinfor-
mation. Data security and privacy rights are of highest im-
portance and we require a defence against mounting cyber 
threats. Eventually, we need to have a secure but open and 
reliable internet that benefits all, people and businesses 
around the world.
Germany advocates for net neutrality, free speech and ac-
cess for all. The Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation 
and Development cooperates closely with developing coun-
tries in digitalisation processes and promotes the inclusion 
of developing countries in all relevant discussions. That is 
why we supported this very first Internet & Jurisdiction 
Global Status Report. 
We wish for the progressing debate on jurisdictional chal-
lenges to the open internet to be inclusive, to involve all 
stakeholders and to be open for all regions of the world. 
D igitalisation and technology are defining parame-ters for how our societies evolve in the 21st centu-ry. On the one hand, technology has the potential 
to lift people out of poverty, improve healthcare and other 
key sectors of society and drive economic growth. On the 
other hand, technology could exacerbate inequalities, un-
dermine fundamental rights and erode public trust in dem-
ocratic institutions. To reap the benefits and minimise the 
risks of technological development, a balanced approach 
is necessary. This requires the right policy framework. We 
therefore need to identify the challenges technology pre-
sents to governance at both the national and international 
level. Cross-border technologies, such as the internet and 
platform economy, bring a range of such challenges.
Denmark therefore welcomes the Internet & Jurisdiction Poli-
cy Network’s effort to map the major trends of the digital soci-
ety. The Internet & Juristiction Global Status Report is a timely 
contribution towards a better understanding of the digital 
age, which is an important step in providing us with a solid 
base for constructive international dialogue and cooperation.
Approximately two years ago, the Danish government de-
cided to elevate technology and digitisation to a strategic 
foreign policy priority – through the TechPlomacy-initiative 
– and to appoint Denmark’s – and in fact the world’s first – 
Ambassador for Technology and Digitization (‘Tech Ambassa-
dor’) and to create a dedicated representation to technology. 
The initiative is a response to the increasing importance that 
technology, digitalisation and the industry has on individuals, 
societies and international relations alike – and the necessi-
ty of boosting the dialogue between the tech industry, gov-
ernments and multilateral organisations. We are working to-
wards a stronger multistakeholder cooperation to ring-fence 
core values and institutions and to promote a human-centric 
approach to technological development. In short, a balanced 
approach where public and private actors take responsibility. 
In recognition of the urgent need for common norms and the 
perseverance of a rules-based international order in the dig-
ital era. To get regulation right and to safeguard democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law.
Digitalization is international and cross-border in nature, 
creating a number of new legal and other challenges to our 
societies and the rule of law in the digital age – an age that 
for the very same reason requires more, not less, interna-
tional cooperation.
CASPER KLYNGE
Danish Tech-ambassador
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
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I n 2018, the world reached an important milestone as more than 50% of its population had gained access to the internet. As demonstrated in the Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status 
Report, the internet has already revolutionized how people, 
businesses and governments interact. The multistakeholder 
governance model of the internet has provided a platform for 
enormous economic development and political progress glob-
ally. In order to continue this progress, it is critical that the ac-
countable multistakeholder model of the internet will be main-
tained even if the growing interdependence on cyberspace 
seems to be creating unprecedented challenges. Although for 
many states, open, free and accessible cyberspace is part of 
their democratic identity, for some, internet governance may 
seem to be yet another tool for executing state control.
Estonia has always supported the open and interoperable in-
ternet. Non-discriminatory access to and accessibility of the 
internet are fundamentally important for enabling and pro-
moting the right to freedom of expression, assembly and as-
sociation. Access to independent media sources, social media 
platforms and a free Internet has become an integral part of 
good governance and a democratic society. While it should 
be clear that the existing international law applies to cyber-
space, there is a need to further develop and implement norms 
of responsible state behaviour in this dynamic field. This evi-
dently requires communication, coordination and cooperation 
among all stakeholders.
The Internet & Juristiction Global Status Report focuses on 
the overarching and topical trends as well as the legal and 
technical approaches and creates links between different 
global and regional initiatives.  One of the incentives for this 
Report was to enable better access to relevant information, 
particularly the existing laws and their application. However, 
there still is a clear need for a meaningful coordination be-
tween multiple actors in the field and the existing initiatives.
The Report provides a comprehensive overview and documen-
tation of the past, current and emerging trends. It also con-
tributes to the global discussion on possible solutions for the 
major cross-border legal policy challenges. As a co-sponsor 
of the Report, Estonia is hoping to create bridges between the 
different initiatives and jurisdictions. We are certain that this 
Report will contribute to better coordination among different 
stakeholders for developing and protecting an interoperable 
and secure internetfor the global multistakeholder community.
T he internet has already been in our lives for decades. It is now a critical means for transformation of our econ-omy and society, and its importance will continue to 
grow. So it is our responsibility to ensure that the internet re-
mains a human-centric, safe and trusted environment.
The EU’s Digital Single Market strategy has achieved a lot in 
this respect. It has given European citizens, businesses, and 
public administrations new working and living opportunities in 
a safe and inclusive way, providing fair access to digital goods, 
content and services. Digital trust has been enhanced through 
the application of the General Data Protection Regulation, or 
the improvement of EU’s resilience to cyber-incidents through 
a new Cybersecurity framework. With the DSM, the EU has 
provided concrete and tangible benefits to European citizens, 
but it has also taken a leading role in setting reference policy 
standards for the digital era. 
The internet is, of course, a global phenomenon, and it is our 
ambition to drive the global policy debate on the internet with 
our partners and all stakeholders who share our values, as part 
of the multistakeholder approach to internet governance. This 
debate, which has traditionally focused on core internet infra-
structures, needs to be broadened to cover issues such as the 
governance of Artificial Intelligence, the free flow of data or 
trust on the internet. Jurisdictional issues such as liability in 
case of services offered over the internet, the choice of law in 
case of dispute or the recognition of national laws and their 
enforcement, are also important. In addressing these issues, 
we must not allow accusations of protectionism to deflect us 
from maintaining a high level of protection of the individual. 
The Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019 offers 
a useful overview of the overarching trends affecting the 
cross-border nature of the internet. We welcome the effort of 
tracking legislative initiatives globally, soft law measures and 
best practices on the internet. This mapping exercise will cer-
tainly enrich the internet governance debate and stimulate the 
multistakeholder community in finding solutions to online ju-
risdictional problems. This is an important discussion to have 
if we want to maintain one global internet.
HELI TIIRMAA-KLAAR
Ambassador at Large for Cyber Diplomacy, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia
PEARSE O’DONOHUE 
Director for Future Networks
DG CONNECT, European Commission
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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y
The internet plays a central role in the lives of billions of people, facilitating cross-bor-
der contacts, trade, and the sharing of ideas and knowledge. Much like the ‘tipping 
points’ that scientists have pointed to in the context of climate change, Internet & Ju-
risdiction Global Status Report 2019 – the first of its kind – shows that if developments 
continue along their current course, we will soon reach a  point at which the cross-bor-
der internet as we know it ceases to exist — and from which attempts at a reversal are 
potentially futile.1 The Global Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019 launched 
an unprecedented structured global mapping process of the state of jurisdiction on the 
internet at global and regional levels.
This Report combines detailed desk research with a pioneering data collection from 
already over 100 key stakeholders of the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network: 
states, Internet companies, technical operators, civil society, academia and interna-
tional organizations. 
Almost 80% of stakeholders think that there is not sufficient international coordina-
tion and coherence to address cross-border legal challenges on the Internet. This is 
a grave concern for the international community as the overwhelming majority of the 
surveyed stakeholders is convinced that cross-border legal challenges on the internet 
will only become more acute in the next three years. More than half of the stakeholders 
think that we do not yet have the right frameworks and standards in place to address 
cross-border legal challenges on the internet. 
According to stakeholders, cross-border legal challenges on the internet are increas-
ingly acute because of three factors:
1.  The world is increasingly becoming interconnected through the internet, thereby 
increasing diversity online;
2.  The internet is deeply affecting societies and economies, meaning that the stakes are 
high; and
3.  Nation states, with different visions, are seeking to increase their control over the 
internet, primarily through national tools rather than transnational cooperation and 
coordination.
The regulatory environment online is characterized by potentially competing or con-
flicting policies and court decisions in the absence of clear-cut standards. The resulting 
complexity may be detrimental on numerous levels because it:
1. Prevents actors from efficiently addressing abuses online;
2. Creates high levels of legal uncertainty in cyberspace;
3.  Risks resulting in competing assertions of jurisdiction and unwanted fragmentation 
of online spaces; 
4.  Creates situations where compliance with one state’s law unavoidably results in a 
direct violation of another state’s law;
5.  Generates distrust amongst internet users who cannot know what laws apply to their 
online activities; and
6.  Hampers digital innovation and growth of the internet economy, especially in devel-
oping countries and for SMEs.
AT A GLANCE…
•  Cross-border legal challenges 
on the internet are increasingly 
acute.
•  Normative plurality in cyberspace 
is rising. 
•  The risk of a harmful legal arms 
race is very high.
•  Important human rights are at 
stake.
•  Cyberspace risks being 
fragmented along national 
borders.
•  Online abuses risk not being 
addressed efficiently in the 
absence of cooperation.
•  Developing countries and SMEs 
are facing significant regulatory 
barriers.
•  The governance ecosystem  
is characterised by competing 
agendas and values.
•  The regulatory complexity  
is increasing, leading to legal 
uncertainty. 
•  Central legal concepts are 
outdated and prevent progress. 
•  Private actors are increasingly 
performing quasi-public 
regulatory and judicial roles.
•  Stakeholders call for appropriate 
institutions, frameworks and 
policy standards.
•  Stakeholders call for greater 
international coordination.
•  Stakeholders call for inclusiveness 
and capacity building.
•  Stakeholders stress the value of  
multistakeholderism.
1.  It is possible to imagine each of these tipping points being reached also on a smaller scale within specific countries or within specific online 
platforms. However, the focus here is on the current internet as a whole.
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The surveys and interviews with key stakeholders reveal several important trends, including: 
1.  The constant flux of digital innovation and transnational nature of the internet makes it increasingly challenging to ad-
dress online abuses with traditional national legal tools; 
2.  Regulatory initiatives by both public and private actors proliferate now at unprecedented speeds around the world;
3.  Stakeholders lose track of the multitude of laws and initiatives around the world; capacity building and consolidated, 
accessible data on trends are needed to make informed decisions and ensure policy coherence;
4.  Extraterritorial assertions of national jurisdiction online are on the rise; and
5. There is a clear need for re-examining and more clearly defining the roles of intermediaries. 
The Report points to several key obstacles to addressing the cross-border legal issues online:
1. There is no common agreement on substantive values;
2 There is no common understanding of key concepts and vernacular;
3. Trust risks being replaced by distrust, and collaboration by the rule of the strongest;
4.  In some regions, stakeholders feel they are subjected online to rules that were developed without them in other parts of 
the world;
Will cross-border legal challenges on the 
internet become increasingly acute in the 
next three years?
I N F O G R A P H I C  1
Strongly
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither Agreenor Disagree Agree
56%5% 39%
SOURCE: Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network: Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019
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5.  Much of what has been done to date has involved trying to solve global problems through a national lens;
6. Urgency-driven unilateral actions tend to prevent a consistent and coordinated approach to regulatory issues; and
7.   There are practical issues such as a lacking access to relevant information due to language and cultural barriers, as well 
as information overload.
There is much that needs to change in order to overcome the cross-border legal challenges facing the online environment. 
The stakeholders specifically pointed to the need for:
1. More cooperation; 
2. Inclusiveness and capacity building;
3. Engaging, in a coordinated manner, with both substantive and procedural standards;
4. Considering the respective roles of the private and the public sector;
5. Transparency and accountability;
6. Solutions pursued on an issue-by-issue basis, or as clusters of issues;
7. Continued, or even expanded, adherence to multistakeholderism; and
8.  A recognition that no state, company or organization can address these issues on its own, and that the ecosystem simply 
cannot afford not to collaborate.
In the end, stakeholders stressed that the issue of jurisdiction on the internet is not just a matter of finding the ‘right’ legal 
principles. Rather, it is fundamentally about developing the frameworks and standards that will shape the future of the 
digital society that we collectively want - for us and the generations after us. 
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2. Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network. I&J Retrospect Database. Retrieved from https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect. 
The desk-research
Desk research adopted conventional legal research meth-
ods and consisted primarily of a comprehensive study 
and analysis of relevant case law, legislation and other 
regulatory initiatives, as well as the literature – includ-
ing books, journal articles, published conference papers 
and industry publications. This was supplemented with a 
detailed study of a variety of valuable reports and other 
materials from a range of bodies over recent years. 
The desk research benefited greatly from the Internet 
& Jurisdiction Policy Network’s wide-ranging collection 
of relevant developments available in the I&J Retrospect 
Database.2 The Retrospect Database is the flagship, 
open-access publication of the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Policy Network, documenting policy developments, judi-
cial decisions, international agreements and other cases 
that reflect jurisdictional tensions on the cross-border 
internet. This important collection provided up-to-date 
insights into current major trends, attitudes, develop-
ments and initiatives.
The materials contained in the Retrospect Database also 
provided important insights into current legal and tech-
nical approaches to solutions, as well as in relation to 
what this Report defines as overarching ‘meta-trends’.    
Method
It is daunting to embark on a mapping and analysis exercise aimed at facilitating a comprehensive understanding of a highly 
complex and dynamic ecosystem – one comprised of multiple actors, initiatives and trends across the policy silos of digital 
economy, human rights and security. Such an undertaking presents several challenges. Most obvious is the difficulty in 
facilitating a sufficiently deep understanding of the complex issues associated with the coexistence of heterogeneous laws 
on the cross-border internet – one of the greatest policy challenges of the 21st century. 
Furthermore, there are challenges associated with seeking to fully understand, and represent fairly, the diverse views and 
multifaceted interests involved. Another considerable challenge is that of the so-called ‘unknown unknowns’; with any re-
search task involving great sectoral and geographical diversity comes a risk of missing something important without even 
realizing that it is missing.   
An awareness of the mentioned challenges shaped the method of this report, and led to the consideration of a flexible, qual-
itative research design that enables an in-depth exploration of the research questions. To overcome the challenges cited 
above, this writing project has adopted a multifaceted research method incorporating an unprecedented and innovative 
large-scale collaborative contribution and review process. This process leveraged the combined expertise of the key stake-
holders engaged in the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network through semi-structured interviews, peer review feedback 
and data collection procedures, combined with detailed and extensive desk research.
Stakeholder survey
The first method for gaining stakeholder input consisted of 
an online survey made up of 17 questions on a variety of topics 
relevant for the research questions. In considering how best 
to gather survey data to inform the research questions, great 
care was taken to design questions that may be answered by 
any of the relevant stakeholders. This ensured that all survey 
participants were exposed to the same set of questions.
The Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network Secretariat iden-
tified survey participants representing all its stakeholder 
groups – i.e., academia, civil society, governments, interna-
tional organizations, internet platforms and the technical 
community – and participants were specifically selected to 
guarantee geographical diversity. To that end, specific geo-
graphic regions were targeted to capture as much variation 
as is possible. Furthermore, the selection of the survey par-
ticipants was purposive, in that they were specifically tar-
geted based on their considerable expertise and knowledge. 
In total, input was received from 100 survey participants 
during a period from Autumn 2018 to Spring 2019. Partic-
ipants provided their views in their personal capacities, 
rather than as representatives of any specific organization. 
Furthermore, input gained from the surveys has only been 
used without attribution.
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“The expert input gained from the survey was invaluable. Apart from bringing 
attention to major topical trends, approaches to solutions, overarching 
meta-trends and generally held concerns in the ecosystem, the survey 
results helped provide both context and a more nuanced understanding of 
the operating environments facing civil society, governments, international 
organizations, internet platforms and the technical community.”
The expert input gained from the survey was invaluable. 
Apart from bringing attention to major topical trends, ap-
proaches to solutions, overarching meta-trends and gen-
erally held concerns in the ecosystem, the survey results 
helped provide both context and a more nuanced under-
standing of the operating environments facing civil society, 
governments, international organizations, internet plat-
forms and the technical community.
Survey results are used throughout the Report to show, in 
figures, the concerns and attitudes of the Internet & Ju-
risdiction Policy Network’s stakeholder ecosystem. In ad-
dition, the comments from surveyed experts are used to 
highlight particularly important arguments, observations 
and concerns. 
Stakeholder interviews
Semi-structured interviews were organized across a broad 
range of stakeholders in order to complement the insights 
gained from the survey responses and desk research. As 
with the surveys, the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network 
Secretariat took care to ensure inclusiveness and diversity, 
with the selected interviewed experts representing aca-
demia, civil society, governments, international organiza-
tions, internet platforms and the technical community, with 
geographical diversity. These stakeholders were identified 
both from within and outside the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Policy Network.
Each interview lasted over 30 minutes, on average. The in-
terviews were conducted in confidence and as such, were 
not recorded. Detailed notes were collated, however, and 
observations recorded in a structured manner facilitating 
cross-referencing and detailed analysis.  
The semi-structured interviews allowed for considerable 
flexibility and catered for supplementary questions based 
on discussions with the interviewee. This – combined with 
the confidentiality guarantee – provided an environment in 
which interviewed experts could highlight matters impor-
tant to them within the topics discussed. In many cases, the 
interviewees could also provide perspectives, insights and 
information that might otherwise have been unattainable by 
researchers. In this way, part of the purpose of the interviews 
was to reduce regional and topical gaps in the desk research.
In total, 63 interviews were carried out from Autumn 2018 to 
Spring 2019. The interviewed experts provided their views 
in their personal capacities rather than as representatives of 
any specific organization. Furthermore, input gained from 
the interviews has only been used without attribution.
Like the comments made by surveyed experts, the inter-
viewed experts’ comments were vital and are used through-
out the Report to highlight particularly important argu-
ments, observations and concerns. 
Stakeholder feedback
Apart from the surveys and interviews, stakeholder input 
was sought by sharing an advanced version of the report 
with contributors. The input gained from this review was 
tremendously valuable and has helped ensure the quali-
ty of this Report, particularly by minimizing regional and 
topical gaps. 
Limitations of the study
A research study of this nature carries certain limitations. 
Despite the steps outlined above, the inevitable risk of 
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gaps must be acknowledged. The statistical relevance of 
exploratory research relying, in part, on a limited number 
of survey participants and interviewed experts should not 
be overstated. In addition, most forms of desk research 
may be accused of involving biases that are difficult to 
eliminate in full.
In light of the above, this Report represents a best-effort 
attempt at painting a broad-brushed, yet comprehensive, 
overview and documentation of past, current and emerging 
trends; relevant actors; and proposed solutions to the major 
cross-border legal policy challenges facing our connected 
society as of 1 January 2019. As such, it is a timely snap-
shot of the policy environment and creates a first baseline 
against which future studies may be undertaken.
Outlook
On the occasion of the 14th United Nations Internet Govern-
ance Forum, full versions of Chapters 3 (Topical Trends), 4 
(Legal and technical approaches) and 5 (Relevant concept 
clusters) will be launched that will supplement the initial 
key findings in this edition. Stakeholders from around the 
world will be invited between June-October 2019 to con-
tribute online to the global data collection and mapping ef-
fort, adding to the input from more than 100 key stakehold-
ers from five continents who contributed to the present Key 
Findings of the first edition of the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Global Status Report 2019.
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The primary aim of the Global Sta-
tus Report is to provide a snap-
shot of the current landscape and 
to reflect the current thinking, 
concerns, trends and proposals of 
the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy 
Network’s diverse stakeholders. 
Thus, the aim is to both provide an 
objective assessment of what this 
ecosystem of stakeholders faces 
today, and to anticipate relevant 
developments by, for example, 
highlighting overarching trends 
that will impact developments for 
the foreseeable future. 
A secondary aim is for the Glob-
al Status Report to be a useful re-
source for capacity building, and for 
creating a greater understanding 
of the complicated issues involved 
— issues that stand to profoundly 
affect the entire ecosystem. To a 
degree, the Report may also provide 
a much-needed  baseline for fu-
ture studies of legal and regulatory 
trends at a global level.
Surveyed experts were asked 
whether they currently have easy 
access to enough information about 
the relevant actors, initiatives, laws 
and court decisions. While the sur-
vey highlighted some regional and 
sectoral differences, it also identi-
fied a clear need for better access 
to relevant information. 
Responding to the call from 
the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network
1 . 1
The Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019 is the first 
of its kind. It is produced in response to the urgent call of over 
200 senior-level stakeholders from 40 countries at the 2nd Global 
Conference of the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network in Ottawa 
in February 2018.
On the topic of cross-border legal 
challenges on the internet, do you 
currently have easy access to 
enough information about:
The relevant court decisions?
YES 32%
NO 68%
The details of relevant 
laws and their application?
NO 65%
YES 35%
The relevant  initiatives?
NO 59%
YES 41%
The relevant actors?
NO 46%
YES 54%
I N F O G R A P H I C  2
SOURCE: Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network: Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019
19
I N T E R N E T  &  J U R I S D I C T I O N  G L O B A L  S T A T U S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 9  K E Y  F I N D I N G S
As these results make clear, there is 
considerably greater access to suf-
ficient information about relevant 
actors and initiatives, than to infor-
mation about the details of relevant 
laws and their application, or to rel-
evant court decisions. Stakeholders 
from non-OECD countries indicated 
a considerably lower degree of easy 
access to information about the rele-
vant actors and initiatives, which sug-
gests a need for capacity building and 
outreach to facilitate ongoing and fu-
ture conversations.
When asked whether there is easy ac-
cess to enough information about the 
details of relevant laws and their ap-
plication, the answer was a resound-
ing ‘no’ across regions and stakeholder 
groups, apart from academia. No less 
than 50 % of respondents from aca-
demia indicated that they have easy 
access to such information, implying 
that the problem is not an absence of 
information, but rather concerns the 
accessibility of such information. This 
can be partly explained by the fact that 
some information sits behind paywalls 
in databases that are commonly acces-
sible to stakeholders in academia, but 
less so for other stakeholder groups. 
Yet there are also numerous free on-
line databases that provide easy ac-
cess to extensive information on the 
details of relevant laws and their ap-
plication.3 Ultimately, then, this aspect 
of the survey results highlights a need 
for capacity building.      
In comments from surveyed and in-
terviewed experts, it was clear that 
respondents were gaining access to 
relevant information, but in neither a 
consistent nor comprehensive man-
ner. The lack of a single authoritative 
source, reliance on multiple (sectoral) 
newsletters, the lack of transparen-
cy and online access, the use of le-
gal jargon, and information overload 
were all mentioned as concerns. The 
01.  Why a Global Status Report, 
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broad scope of the topic may be a fac-
tor, as well. As made clear in Chapter 
Three, which examines topical trends, 
cross-border legal challenges on the 
internet arise in such a diverse range 
of substantive areas that it is extreme-
ly onerous and challenging to stay up-
to-date. 
It is noteworthy that the surveyed ex-
perts made no specific reference to 
academic writings as a source of in-
formation, suggesting that the work of 
academics does not effectively reach 
the other stakeholder groups. There 
would be significant value in explor-
ing options for improving this transfer 
of knowledge.
In enabling evidence-based policy in-
novation, the Report seeks to provide 
all stakeholders with the necessary 
information to develop frameworks 
and policy standards for the digital 
society and economy. It aims to give 
a comprehensive and regionally bal-
anced overview and documentation 
of past, current and emerging trends, 
relevant actors and proposed solutions 
to the major cross-border legal policy 
challenges facing the connected soci-
ety. In doing so, the Report accounts 
for the fact that the internet may be 
approached as: (a) a physical techni-
cal infrastructure (i.e., the hardware, 
routers, servers, computers, satellites, 
fiber optic cables, etc.); (b) a logical 
structure (i.e., the technical protocols 
that govern online interactions); and 
(c) a social construct made up of the 
available content and cyber activities.
The Report complements the ongoing 
policy development process facilitat-
ed by the Secretariat of the Internet 
& Jurisdiction Policy Network. Thus, 
it builds upon the findings and issues 
addressed in the three thematic Pro-
grams of the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Policy Network, namely: 
1. Data & Jurisdiction Program; 
2. Content & Jurisdiction Program; 
3. Domains & Jurisdiction Program. 
The Report’s topical coverage has been 
selected, and is limited, by reference to 
the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Net-
work’s focus on internet governance 
at the intersection of the three areas 
of digital economy, human rights, and 
cybersecurity. Therefore, the coverage 
is not limited to questions of internet 
jurisdiction per se, but rather encom-
passes a broad range of procedural and 
substantive law issues falling within 
the broad topic of cross-border legal 
challenges facing the internet.
In alignment with the Internet & Juris-
diction Policy Network’s focus areas, 
the Report  addresses neither cyber-
war, nor cyber conflict more broadly. 
At the same time, it is not always pos-
sible to distinguish activities that fit 
within the field of cyber conflict from 
those that do not, the online environ-
“The coverage is not limited to questions of  
internet jurisdiction per se, but rather encompasses  
a broad range of procedural and substantive  
law issues falling within the broad topic of  
cross-border legal challenges facing the internet.” 
3. Free Access to Law Movement. Retrieved from http://www.falm.info/members/current/.
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Transnational as the new normal
1 . 2
ment. For example, cyber espionage 
is carried out for both military and 
economic purposes, and when it is 
directed at defense industries or crit-
ical infrastructure, distinguishing be-
tween military and non-military es-
pionage may be virtually impossible; 
rather, such espionage activities are 
simultaneously military and non-mil-
itary. Likewise, drawing a sharp line 
between national security informa-
tion sharing and information sharing 
in the context of law enforcement is 
not always possible, either. 
A significant number of stakeholders 
have called for a timely compendium 
of global activities. It is hoped that 
this Report – made possible by the 
strong support that the Internet & Ju-
risdiction Policy Network enjoys from 
its stakeholders – can meet that need 
and serve as a crucial instrument to 
help foster policy coherence across 
ongoing initiatives. 
Thus, the Report stands to contrib-
ute to the mitigation of acute juris-
dictional conflicts, to support the 
development of concrete operational 
solutions, and to preserve the ben-
efits of the open, interoperable and 
cross-border internet.
The world consists of nearly 200 
countries, some industrialized and 
some developing. All these countries 
have their own history, economy and 
cultures. They have different social 
structures, political systems and laws. 
Many are home to a diverse range 
of cultures, and some have a diverse 
range of laws. The people who pop-
ulate these countries are of different 
ethnicities, and they speak different 
languages. They hold different values, 
religious beliefs and political opin-
ions. Indeed, even where they hold 
the same values as important, they 
frequently take different views on 
how those shared values should be 
balanced in cases where they clash 
with one another. This incredible di-
versity stands in contrast to the fact 
that we all – so far – essentially share 
one internet.   
During interviews carried out in sup-
port of the Report drafting, the Eu-
ropean Union’s General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR), introduced in 
2018, was by far the most frequently 
mentioned legal initiative. Few, if any, 
previous legislative initiatives have 
gained a similar degree of interna-
tional attention. So why is it that one 
can speak to people from anywhere in 
the world and find that they are not 
only aware, but have detailed knowl-
edge, of the GDPR – a law issued by 
lawmakers in Europe, far away from 
countries such as Australia, Brazil, 
China and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo? When the European Un-
ion introduced its Data Protection 
Directive in the mid-1990s, it gained 
only limited and sectoral international 
attention. What then changed in the 
world to render the GDPR a virtually 
ubiquitous topic of discussion?
The answer is probably twofold. First, 
globalization has changed the world 
since the mid-1990s, and the eco-
system is now more alert to how the 
laws of one jurisdiction can impact 
people in other parts of the world. 
This is an inescapable consequence of 
increased interconnectedness. Fur-
ther, states are now more frequently 
looking to other states when seeking 
to shape their own legal responses to 
the challenges that stakeholders face. 
The internet has strongly contributed 
to these developments. Second, there 
is now considerably greater recogni-
tion of the role that data — and there-
fore data privacy — play in our lives. 
This change, too, has been predomi-
nantly driven by the internet.
The GDPR is merely one of many laws 
that impact individuals beyond their 
original jurisdiction. In fact, most 
countries’ laws have such an impact 
on some level. As many interviewed 
experts observed, this makes for an 
increasingly complex regulatory en-
vironment. 
The observation that the online envi-
ronment is largely transnational may 
seem like little more than a truism; but 
this trend has profound implications, 
giving rise to problems and affecting 
approaches to their solution. Sever-
al interviewed and surveyed experts 
noted that matters that were once de-
termined domestically are now trans-
national in nature, necessitating a dif-
ferent mindset among decision makers 
on all levels. The stakes are high, and 
the diversity is great.
The importance of communication 
(including cross-border communica-
tion) is well-established; and no other 
medium can facilitate cross-border 
communication as fluidly as the in-
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“Trust is being 
replaced by distrust, 
collaboration by the 
rule of the strongest.”
ternet. The online environment lends 
itself to the kind of cross-border com-
munication that online communities 
in both industrialized and developing 
countries expect, and that can lead 
to cross-border disputes. Addressing 
transnational issues is therefore not 
optional, and the necessary internet 
jurisdiction rules must be able to cope 
with a high volume of disputes.
As an international environment, is-
sues of internet regulation also require 
internationally oriented solutions; 
whether pursued on an international or 
domestic level, solutions must account 
for the international context in which 
they will operate. Both useful and 
harmful approaches are likely to have 
cross-border implications and may 
spread internationally. Kant’s ‘categori-
cal imperative’ comes to mind, prompt-
ing the pursuit of universal solutions.
Unfortunately, the international cli-
mate has recently changed. There 
is a significant move away from in-
ternational collaborative efforts and 
common goals, as more states adopt 
inward-looking policies and put their 
own immediate interests first. Trust is 
being replaced by distrust, collabora-
tion by the rule of the strongest. This 
political trend represents a substan-
tial obstacle for the effective coordi-
nation of internet regulation. How-
ever, it remains an inescapable fact 
that cross-border legal challenges on 
the internet can only be addressed 
through international collaborative 
efforts and the pursuit of common 
goals; no state, company or organiza-
tion can do this on its own, and the 
ecosystem simply cannot afford not 
to collaborate.
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Growing concern over abuses
1 . 3
Are online abuses, for example in the form of 
hate speech, harassment, hacking, privacy 
violations, or fraud, increasing?
Strongly
Agree
38%
Strongly
Disagree Disagree
AgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
I N F O G R A P H I C  3
27% 31%4%
Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
Strongly
Agree
AgreeDisagree
STATES
INTERNET COMPANIES
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
ACADEMIA
TECHNICAL OPERATORS
CIVIL SOCIETY
45%
50%
28,6%
22,2%
29,4%
21%
30%
16,7%
42,8%
33,3%
41,2%
47,4%
25%
33,3%
25%
33,3%
23,5%
31,6%
0%
0%
3,6%
11,2%
5,9%
0%
SOURCE: Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network: Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019
There is a general feeling among the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network’s stakeholders that online abuse is increasing. 
A clear majority – 69% of surveyed experts –  either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that online abuses (e.g., in the form of hate 
speech, harassment, hacking, privacy violations, or fraud) are increasing. 27% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, and only 4% 
‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’.
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Despite the agreement that online 
abuses (e.g., hate speech, harassment, 
hacking, privacy violations, or fraud) 
are increasing, the percentage of re-
spondents that ‘neither agreed nor 
disagreed’ was substantial and many 
surveyed experts said the lack of em-
pirical evidence made it difficult to an-
swer this question.
This observation is both fair and im-
portant. It directs attention to the fact 
that there is currently a lack of relia-
ble data, which, in turn, is linked to the 
need to standardize methods and initi-
atives to collect reliable data to inform 
policy decisions. 
A recurring theme in comments made 
by surveyed experts is that while online 
abuses are increasing, so is the overall 
use of the internet — in other words, 
both abuse and normal use are increas-
ing. One surveyed expert noted that 
this is a question of percentages versus 
absolute numbers. With more people 
online, and more layers of services and 
platforms, the absolute volume of both 
online abuse and the people affected by 
it increase. Yet this is a separate mat-
ter to whether there is an increase in 
the percentage of people misbehaving 
out of the overall body of internet us-
ers. Some surveyed experts also noted 
that as awareness of online abuses has 
increased, so too has the willingness to 
report abuses. 
Both these factors may contribute to 
a perception that online abuses are 
increasing. A key trend here is that in-
creasing awareness of, and sensitivity 
to, these abuses result in increasing 
political pressure to address them. This 
political pressure risks sparking unco-
ordinated, unilateral reactions that do 
not achieve desirable long-term effects.
Some interviewed experts made the 
point that the internet merely mirrors 
conduct offline.  One surveyed ex-
pert suggested that abuse is increas-
ing both offline and online because 
of the current political and economic 
climate, and that online platforms sim-
ply reflect society. Different types of 
abuses emerge online, as well.  The in-
ternet gives greater visibility to things 
that were heretofore largely restrict-
ed to the private sphere, and makes it 
easier for them to spread.
Another interviewed expert em-
phasized that these dynamics differ 
across cultures, and that there are 
increasing differences in what is seen 
as harassment, privacy violations and 
hate speech.
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Will cross-border legal challenges  
on the internet become increasingly  
acute in the next three years?
Comments provided by surveyed ex-
perts highlighted a widely held view 
that the combination of three factors 
will make cross-border legal challeng-
es on the internet increasingly acute:
1.  The world is increasingly becoming 
interconnected through the inter-
net, thereby increasing diversity 
online;
2.  The internet is deeply affecting 
societies and economies, meaning 
that the stakes are high; and
3.  Nation states with different visions 
are seeking to increase their con-
trol over the internet, primarily by 
using national tools rather than 
transnational cooperation and co-
ordination.
As one surveyed expert pointed out, 
in all this, the internet is neither the 
problem, nor the cause of the problem. 
Rather, the internet is the victim.
A majority (56%) of surveyed experts ‘strongly agreed’ that the cross-border legal challenges on the internet will become 
increasingly acute in the next three years. A further 39% ‘agreed’ and nobody ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’, while 5% 
responded that they have no view on this question.
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“As one surveyed 
expert pointed out, in 
all this, the internet is 
neither the problem, 
nor the cause of the 
problem. Rather, the 
internet is the victim.”
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01.  Why a Global Status Report, 
and What is at Stake?
Competing legitimate 
interests need reconciling
Existing legal concepts are under stress
1 . 4
1 . 5
A ‘genuine regulatory challenge’ exists where there are competing 
legitimate interests that are difficult to reconcile. In the context of 
internet jurisdiction, there are numerous instances of competing 
legitimate interests. For example, state A’s protection of free speech 
may be difficult to reconcile with state B’s restrictions on hate speech. 
In more detail, the genuine regulatory 
challenges facing the ecosystem can 
be boiled down to the need to recon-
cile the three dimensions of: 
1. fighting abuses; 
2. protecting human rights; and 
3. promoting the digital economy. 
To a great extent, the difficulties in 
finding solutions to cross-border legal 
challenges on the internet stem from 
the fact that the genuine regulatory 
challenges are numerous and involve 
legal notions that are central to the 
very identity of each state. Yet this 
does not fully explain the complexity 
of the situation facing the ecosystem. 
Some of the challenges stem instead 
from the inadequacy of the legal con-
cepts used.
Their application online often involves 
decisions on the appropriate analogies 
and metaphors. The impact of such 
decisions was highlighted in the mid-
1990s during the debate over the con-
stitutionality of the US Communica-
tion Decency Act (CDA),4  and was again 
on display in the 2016 Supreme Court 
of Canada hearing in the Equustek 
case.5 Representing Google Inc, Mc-
Dowell suggested that Google search 
was akin to a librarian that managed 
one of several card catalogues. In con-
trast, Justice Karakatsanis suggested a 
different analogy, comparing Google 
search to the person behind the coun-
ter of a bookstore. The choice of anal-
ogy would clearly impact the question 
of responsibility.
Several interviewed experts empha-
sized the concern that in the juris-
diction field, legal concepts are old 
fashioned and outdated. This creates 
‘artificial regulatory challenges’ in that 
the frameworks and concepts being 
applied are insufficient to address the 
issues; in other words, the inadequa-
cy of the tools may cause regulatory 
challenges. This prevents, or at least 
limits, progress. 
Concerns about  
legal concepts
One of the survey questions posed the 
claim that we already apply the right 
legal concepts to address cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet. 
Among surveyed experts, 46% either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed, 36% 
indicated that they neither agreed nor 
disagreed, and 18% either agreed or 
strongly agreed. 
Most legal concepts with which we work – such as the focus
on the location of evidence – were developed in the offline context. 
4. Webach, K. (1997). Digital tornado: The internet and telecommunications policy. (Working paper of the Federal Communications Commission), 
5. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc 2017 SCC 34.
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Are we already applying the right legal 
concepts to address cross-border legal 
challenges on the Internet?
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Comments from surveyed experts of-
fer guidance as to how these statis-
tics should be understood, and what 
the concerns are. For example, one 
surveyed expert qualified their agree-
ment with the above claim because 
although the basic legal concepts are 
sound and relevant, their application 
to the online environment remains a 
challenge. This concern is also recur-
ring in the literature.
Another surveyed expert noted that 
there are several lacunae in the legal 
concepts, and yet another emphasized 
that there is a categorically new chal-
lenge in melding the global internet 
with national borders, and that we 
do not have the right legal concepts 
or principles for this task. The latter 
surveyed expert also made the point 
that this challenge is more complicat-
ed than other cross-border challeng-
es, such as the regulation of financial 
transactions or airspace. 
These survey responses correspond 
to observations commonly made in 
the literature. For example, the mo-
bility of data undermines the utility of 
several traditional jurisdictional an-
chor points.
“Too much of 
the discussion of 
cross-border legal 
challenges on the 
internet relies on legal 
concepts involving 
imprecise abstractions 
that are difficult to 
operationalize.”
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01.  Why a Global Status Report, 
and What is at Stake?
6. American Libraries Association v Pataki 1997 SDNY 969 F Supp 160, 170 (per Preska J).
7. Or ‘conflict of laws’ as ‘private international law’ often is referred to in Common Law countries.
8.  Introductory Comment to the Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime 1935. (1935). Supplement American Journal of 
International Law, 29, 443, p. 445.
9. See Chapter 5 ‘Relevant concept clusters 101’ for definitions of these concepts.
A related concern is that arguably 
too much of the discussion around 
cross-border legal challenges on the 
internet relies on legal concepts in-
volving imprecise abstractions that 
are difficult to operationalize. In part, 
this is due to differing understand-
ings of legal concepts. One example 
of this is found in the term ‘comity,’ 
which has a quite specific meaning in 
US law but remains a vague and con-
troversial concept in international 
law. Due to the variations in legal sys-
tems around the world, one surveyed 
expert noted, it might be difficult to 
even assert which are the ‘right legal 
concepts’. Another surveyed expert 
pointed out that while some regions 
of the world work with the ‘right’ le-
gal concepts, we do not do so on a 
global level. 
One surveyed expert noted that courts 
lack the right black letter law frame-
work. However, the same expert also 
added that arriving at the right black 
letter law framework would not be so 
difficult and would not require any 
major reinvention of the law. 
In this context, a potential barrier is 
the degree to which courts properly 
understand and keep up with techno-
logical developments. This challenge 
was once openly acknowledged by 
courts. Most famously, in 1997, the US 
District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York observed that: “Judg-
es and legislators faced with adapting 
existing legal standards to the novel 
environment of cyberspace struggle 
with terms and concepts that the aver-
age […] five-year-old tosses about with 
breezy familiarity.”6  Today, one rarely 
sees such open admissions.
Due to the complexity involved, few 
areas are as plagued by artificial reg-
ulatory challenges as the debate about 
cross-border legal challenges on the 
internet. One need only consider the 
conceptual complexity involved in 
analyzing a standard cross-border le-
gal issue, such as a claim of jurisdiction 
over conduct that occurs in another 
state but affects the state making the 
claim. In such a situation, tradition 
would dictate beginning with a con-
sideration of whether the matter falls 
within public or private international 
law – a question that does not always 
have an obvious answer.7 
If the matter falls under private inter-
national law, there is a need to con-
sider other matters, such as whether 
there are grounds for claiming person-
al jurisdiction and subject matter juris-
diction. Then, there is a need to iden-
tify the applicable law and determine 
whether there are any grounds for the 
court in question to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction. Only then can the matter 
be heard. Once a judgment is issued, 
new issues arise around recognition 
and enforcement.   
If the matter rather falls under public 
international law, tradition points to at 
least three different types of jurisdic-
tion for consideration – prescriptive, 
adjudicative and enforcement jurisdic-
tion, to which a fourth (investigative 
jurisdiction) has recently been added. 
Each of these types of jurisdiction is 
associated with unclear criteria, and 
it is not always obvious to which cat-
egory a given matter would belong. 
For prescriptive jurisdiction, there is a 
set of commonly referenced principles 
known as the Harvard Draft princi-
ples8, with the addition of the so-called 
‘effects doctrine’. These principles 
were originally drafted for a narrower 
purpose compared to how they are of-
ten treated today. The criteria are less 
clear for adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction, however, and the detailed 
criteria for investigative jurisdiction 
remain to be developed.
If the claim of jurisdiction overcomes 
these hurdles, there are still numerous 
other considerations, such as:
•  Would the claim of jurisdiction vi-
olate the sovereignty of another 
state?
•  Would the claim of jurisdiction be 
contrary to the duty of non-inter-
vention?
•  Would the claim of jurisdiction be 
contrary to comity?
•  Is the claim of jurisdiction in fact 
mandated by the due diligence 
principle?10 
This conceptual complexity works as a 
‘barrier to entry’, preventing the ‘unini-
tiated’ from contributing to the debate, 
and risks making this field the exclusive 
domain of a small group of specialist 
lawyers. It also regularly results in mis-
understandings and miscommunication. 
Furthermore, it creates an environment 
in which discussions are characterized 
by overly broad and simplistic claims, 
leading to locked positions; too often, 
the legal concepts are not debated in a 
systematic manner. Instead, there is a 
tendency to pick and choose concepts 
that support any given position.
A proponent of a claim of jurisdic-
tion may, for example, feel vindicat-
ed by the ‘effects doctrine’ (while ig-
noring all other principles), while an 
opponent to the same claim may feel 
vindicated by the ‘comity principle’ 
(while ignoring all other principles). 
The complexity may hide the flaws 
in their respective approaches, and 
because they both feel supported by 
law, the likelihood of agreement – or 
even of a constructive discussion – is 
low. This highlights a clear need for 
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a simpler legal framework of founda-
tional principles in which to anchor 
the discussion. The Report points to 
a possible overarching jurisprudential 
framework for jurisdiction in which 
attention is directed at three criteria: 
1.  whether there is a substantial con-
nection between the matter and the 
state seeking to exercise jurisdiction;
2.  whether the state seeking to ex-
ercise jurisdiction has a legitimate 
interest in the matter; and
3.  whether the exercise of jurisdiction 
is reasonable given the balance be-
tween the state’s legitimate inter-
ests and other interests.
These criteria transcend the perceived 
gap between public and private law, 
and can incorporate both effects doc-
trine and comity, as well as other rel-
evant public and private international 
law concepts. As such, they amount 
to a suitable foundation upon which 
to build more detailed legal norms for 
specific contexts.
Current discussions of cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet 
predominantly focus on tackling the 
most pressing day-to-day issues (i.e., 
some of the genuine regulatory chal-
lenges), at the expense of focusing on 
the underlying conceptual complexity 
(i.e., the artificial regulatory challeng-
es). This is natural, given the impact 
that these challenges have for soci-
ety. However, real progress can only 
be made if the ecosystem also tackles 
the artificial regulatory challenges. 
Indeed, the artificial regulatory chal-
lenges must first be addressed in or-
der to adequately address the genuine 
regulatory challenges. It is hoped that 
this Report can contribute to this im-
portant task.
To this end, the subsequent Chapters 
of this Report take care to not only 
engage with and outline the genuine 
regulatory challenges, but to do so in a 
manner that may mitigate some of the 
artificial regulatory challenges alluded 
to here. 
“Current discussions 
of cross-border legal 
challenges on the internet 
predominantly focus on 
tackling the most pressing 
day-to-day issues 
(i.e., some of the genuine 
regulatory challenges), 
at the expense of focusing 
on the underlying 
conceptual complexity 
(i.e., the artificial 
regulatory challenges).” 
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Proper frameworks 
and institutions are lacking
1 . 6
The Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network’s stakeholders pointed to 
a current lack of appropriate institutions to address cross-border 
legal challenges on the internet. 
Do we have the right institutions 
to address cross-border legal 
challenges on the internet?
01. Why a Global Status Report, 
and What is at Stake?
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The majority (58%) of surveyed experts either ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ that we already have the right institutions 
in place to address cross-border legal challenges on the internet. Only 15% of surveyed experts stated either ‘agreed’ or 
‘strongly agreed’, while 27% indicated that they neither ‘agreed’ nor ‘disagreed’.
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Some surveyed experts commented 
that awareness of the sensitivity of 
cross-border legal challenges on the 
internet is often low in current in-
stitutions – both internationally and 
domestically – and that they need 
to evolve and better cooperate with 
one another. Among surveyed and in-
terviewed experts, there was a clear 
majority view that although numer-
ous institutions work on these issues, 
additional fora or institutions might 
be beneficial. A smaller number ex-
pressed doubt about the need for ad-
ditional institutions.
Another aspect of lacking coordina-
tion relates to the availability of ap-
propriate frameworks and standards.
44.5% of surveyed experts ‘disa-
greed’, and a further 10% ‘strongly 
disagreed’, with the assertion that we 
have the frameworks and standards 
to address cross-border legal chal-
lenges on the internet. Only 11% of 
surveyed experts ‘agreed’, and none 
‘strongly agreed’. 34.5% of surveyed 
experts indicated that they neither 
‘agreed’ nor ‘disagreed’.
Do we have the right frameworks and 
standards to address cross-border legal 
challenges on the internet?
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01.  Why a Global Status Report, 
and What is at Stake?
Coordination is insufficient
1 . 7
The stakeholders sent a strong message that current 
coordination efforts are insufficient.
Is there sufficient international coordination 
and coherence to address cross-border legal 
challenges on the Internet?
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In their comments, surveyed experts 
pointed to regional differences, with 
some noting that global standards do 
not exist and are unachievable. Others 
pointed out that the cross-border le-
gal challenges on the internet are be-
ing addressed under ordinary domes-
tic laws, with some adding that many 
cross-border challenges cannot effec-
tively be addressed within the national 
domain. This highlights several things:
1.  states are attempting to address 
these issues by applying their ex-
isting laws;
2.  but national responses are inade-
quate; therefore,
3.  there is a clear need for transnation-
al coordination and cooperation.
Asked whether there is sufficient international coordination and coherence to address cross-border 
legal challenges on the internet, no less than 79% of surveyed experts answered ‘no’, while only 4.5% 
answered ‘yes’. 16.5% responded that they have no view on this question.
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While the survey result shows a clear 
and overwhelming consensus across 
stakeholder groups and regions, it 
should be noted that some surveyed 
experts said robust international coor-
dination and cooperation can be seen 
among certain groups and in certain 
sectors. One example mentioned was 
coordination among law enforcement 
agencies, e.g., via the work of Interpol, 
Europol and the Council of Europe.
Fundamental attributes
of the internet are at stake
1 . 8
Should the internet be preserved? While the vagueness of this question is 
obvious, the instinctive answer is probably still a resounding ‘yes’. After all, the 
internet has already revolutionized how people, businesses and governments 
interact; it plays a central role in the lives of billions of people, and has brought 
numerous significant economical and societal benefits.
At the same time, it is widely recog-
nized that the internet is constantly 
evolving. This is perhaps particularly 
true in developing countries, where 
the internet’s uptake, structure and 
usage are evolving quickly. As the way 
we use the internet has changed over 
the years, so too has the content avail-
able online and the internet’s techni-
cal infrastructure. Online, change is 
constant and natural, and it typically 
translates into desirable progress. 
Nevertheless, there are perhaps cer-
tain characteristics of the internet that 
ought to be shielded against change. 
If so, what might those characteristics 
be? What is it about the internet that 
instinctively deserves to be preserved?
These kinds of questions may be an-
swered at different levels of abstrac-
tion. At a relatively high level, one 
might point to the internet’s openness, 
and its role as an enabler and protec-
tor of human rights and democratic 
values, as qualities that are particularly 
worth preserving. Other such qualities 
include the internet’s potential to con-
tribute to a fairer and more equitable 
world, and to bring people closer to-
gether through a global communica-
tions medium, ultimately supporting a 
peaceful coexistence. 
Unfortunately, all these characteristics 
are currently under threat, to varying 
“The characteristics of 
the internet that are to 
be preserved must be 
actively protected.”
1 . 8 . 1
The cross-border internet cannot be taken for granted
degrees, and they cannot be taken for 
granted. Rather, it must be recognized 
that the internet is a fragile environ-
ment and that the characteristics of the 
internet that are to be preserved must 
be actively protected. Two such char-
acteristics are the internet’s cross-bor-
der and permission-less nature – both 
of which are under threat.
As noted in a brief September 2018 
Internet Society concept note on the 
internet and extra-territorial effects of 
laws: “Globalization is a feature of the 
internet, not a bug, and legal systems 
everywhere should recognize this, 
not try to ‘fix’ it.”10 This observation is 
both accurate and important. Yet as 
discussed in detail below, the regula-
tory landscape online (and offline) has 
always been fragmented. This is a di-
rect consequence of the sovereignty 
that states enjoy, insofar as they have 
the capacity to make their own laws. 
Indeed, it has been noted that the dif-
ficulty of applying and enforcing any 
regulatory system online may be at-
tributed to the fact that the internet’s 
operation involves a highly fragmented 
universe of actors, norms, procedures, 
processes and institutions, including 
many non-state entities.11  
Although this kind of fragmentation is 
nothing new in the online ecosystem, 
10. Internet Society. (2018, September). The internet and extra-territorial application of laws. Retrieved from https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/The-internet-and-extra-territorial-application-of-laws-EN.pdf, p. 1. 
11. Kuner, C.. (2017, February 1). The internet and the global reach of EU Law. Law Society Economy Working Papers No. 4/2017. Retrieved from SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2890930 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2890930, p. 7.
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12. PwC. (2018). Revitalizing privacy and trust in a data-driven world. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cybersecurity/assets/revitalizing-
privacy-trust-in-data-driven-world.pdf
13. World Economic Forum. (2016). Internet fragmentation: An overview. Retrieved from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FII_internet_
Fragmentation_An_Overview_2016.pdf, p. 3.
01.  Why a Global Status Report, 
and What is at Stake?
states are making increasingly aggres-
sive jurisdictional claims and backing 
up those claims with heavy fines or even 
the threat of imprisonment, raising the 
stakes for the subjects of regulations. 
Therefore, both natural and legal per-
sons may opt to avoid being present 
on certain markets. For example, those 
wishing to avoid contact with certain 
states may utilize technical measures 
such as the geo-location technologies, 
or non-technical measures such as dis-
claimers or terms of service.
Whether technical or non-technical, 
this type of fragmentation – if wide-
spread – is a threat to the cross-border 
internet, and carries both societal and 
economic consequences. Fragmenta-
tion online contributes to fragmenta-
tion offline, resulting in a loss of some 
useful interactions and cross-border 
engagements that may spark mutu-
al trust and understanding. As to the 
financial side, it has been noted that: 
“The balkanization of the internet will 
change how companies do business. 
This will likely reduce efficiency and, 
in a macro way, have some effect on 
the global economy.”12 
At the same time, it may be argued 
that some degree of fragmentation is 
the only way to uphold national rules 
– which may be necessary to avoid a 
lawless internet – and avoid claims of 
global scope of jurisdiction. The task, 
then, is to determine the type and 
degree of acceptable fragmentation, 
without endangering the character-
istics of the internet that should be 
shielded from change.
In a sense, what we are witnessing is 
a decreasing gap between the initially 
borderless internet and the territorial-
ly grounded legal systems; the internet 
is becoming less ‘borderless’, and legal 
systems are becoming less anchored 
in territoriality. If properly coordinat-
ed and managed, this development 
stands to provide great benefits to 
both the fight against abuses and the 
protection of human rights, as well as 
the digital economy. If mismanaged, 
however, it may spell disaster for the 
online environment.    
Yet fragmentation also occurs in a 
more technical sense. A useful distinc-
tion has been made between fragmen-
tation on the internet, as discussed 
above, and fragmentation of the inter-
net – fragmentation of the internet’s 
underlying physical and logical infra-
structures.13
The physical backbone of fiber op-
tic cables crossing oceans and inter-
national borders enables a relatively 
seamless online experience regardless 
of location. Traditionally, these cables 
have been controlled by telecommuni-
cations operators, but a shift in own-
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ership has given rise to at least two 
‘new’ types of owners. The first is the 
major internet companies. Some of 
these companies have invested in their 
own trans-oceanic cables, resulting in 
private networks that connect their 
data centers and operate outside of 
the rules that have governed the inter-
net and its network operators to date, 
such as those pertaining to common 
carriage and neutrality.14  
The second category of new cable 
owners includes nation states seeking 
to pursue geo-political cyber strate-
gies. China, most notably, is making 
significant investments to build a ge-
ographically strategic infrastructure 
that allows data to flow around the 
world entirely on Chinese-owned fib-
er optic infrastructure.15 Such a na-
tion-controlled infrastructure may be 
applied in order to reduce access to in-
formation, limit participation in online 
forums, restrict data privacy and free-
dom of expression, and perhaps em-
bed surveillance and censorship capa-
bilities.16 These developments could be 
seen as a logical extension of the Great 
Firewall of China, and may in fact make 
the current Great Firewall of China re-
dundant. At any rate, they represent a 
serious attack on the neutrality of the 
internet’s core infrastructure. Fur-
thermore, they represent a step away 
from the internet as a ‘network of net-
works’ – a key feature that encourages 
a multistakeholder approach to inter-
net governance – and pose a threat to 
the cross-border internet. 
Another technological step that may 
lead to fragmentation is the Russian 
government’s ambitions to   develop a 
separate backup of system of Domain 
Name Servers (DNS), which, according 
to 2017 reports, would not be subject 
to control by international organiza-
tions.18 The Press Secretary of the Rus-
sian Presidency has specified that Rus-
sia does not intend to disconnect from 
the global internet, arguing instead 
that recent unpredictability from the 
US and EU demanded that Russia be 
prepared for any turn of events.18  On 
February 11, 2019, it was reported that 
Russia has taken several major steps in 
this direction.19
Furthermore, major satellite-based 
internet connectivity, while largely in 
its infancy, may have the potential to 
facilitate and accelerate fragmentation 
of the internet.
In a sense, the fragmentation of tech-
nical infrastructure likely poses a 
greater threat to the global internet 
than fragmentation arising from the 
regulatory landscape online. Moreo-
ver, while there is a degree of political 
will to attempt to overcome the neg-
ative effects of fragmentation sparked 
by regulatory challenges, there are 
currently no signs of any develop-
ments that may prevent or even slow 
down the fragmentation of technical 
infrastructure.
In tackling these issues, it is essential 
to keep in mind that the cross-border 
internet cannot be taken for granted; 
it is a resource that needs to be active-
ly protected. Indeed, the cross-border 
internet – both from a technical and 
regulatory perspective – is a sensi-
tive and fragile environment compris-
ing multiple stakeholders and actors; 
changes for one stakeholder group 
may have irreversible flow-on conse-
quences for others. 
14. Song, S. Internet drift: How the internet is likely to splinter and fracture. Digital Freedom Fund. Retrieved from https://digitalfreedomfund.org/
internet-drift-how-the-internet-is-likely-to-splinter-and-fracture/. 
15. Song, S. Internet drift: How the internet is likely to splinter and fracture. Digital Freedom Fund. Retrieved from https://digitalfreedomfund.org/
internet-drift-how-the-internet-is-likely-to-splinter-and-fracture/. 
16. Song, S. Internet drift: How the internet is likely to splinter and fracture. Digital Freedom Fund. Retrieved from https://digitalfreedomfund.org/
internet-drift-how-the-internet-is-likely-to-splinter-and-fracture/.
17. Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network. (2017, December). Russia reportedly moves ahead with plan to create independent DNS backup for BRICS 
countries. I&J Retrospect Database. Retrieved from https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect#article-6626_2017-12. 
18. RT. (2018, February 20). Russia to launch ‘independent internet’ for BRICS nations - report. Retrieved from https://www.rt.com/politics/411156-
russia-to-launch-independent-internet/. 
19. Cimpanu, C. (2019, February 11). Russia to disconnect from the internet as part of a planned test. ZD Net. Retrieved from https://www.zdnet.com/
article/russia-to-disconnect-from-the-internet-as-part-of-a-planned-test/.
20. NETmundial Initiative. The NETMundial Principles. Retrieved from http://netmundial.org/princi
1 . 8 . 2
The permission-less nature of the internet needs active protection 
A distinctive feature of the online envi-
ronment is its permission-less nature. 
In setting up a website, for example, 
one may be responsible and liable 
for that website, but no permission 
is required to launch it. By removing 
barriers to entry, the permission-less 
nature of the online environment has 
been a great facilitator of innovation, 
and its importance is widely recog-
nized. One of the NETmundial princi-
ples articulates this importance:
“The ability to innovate and create 
has been at the heart of the remark-
able growth of the internet and it has 
brought great value to the global so-
ciety. For the preservation of its dy-
namism, internet governance must 
continue to allow permission-less in-
novation through an enabling internet 
environment, consistent with other 
principles in this document. Enter-
prise and investment in infrastructure 
are essential components of an ena-
bling environment.”20 
The EU’s e-commerce Directive from 
2000 includes another articulation of 
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the permission-less nature of the on-
line environment. Article 4(1) empha-
sizes that: “Member States shall ensure 
that the taking up and pursuit of the 
activity of an information society ser-
vice provider may not be made subject 
to prior authorisation or any other re-
quirement having equivalent effect.”21 
The fact that the internet, by tradition, 
has been a network of networks with-
out a central authority has assisted – or 
even necessitated – the permission-less 
nature discussed here. However, with 
the move toward infrastructure-level 
fragmentation, the permission-less na-
ture cannot be taken for granted in the 
future. Rather, it must be actively pro-
tected and preserved.
21.  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, Article 4(1).
Not addressing jurisdictional 
challenges comes at a high cost
1 . 9
A failure to properly address the cross-border legal challenges on the internet 
will result in high costs for all stakeholders and may cause irreparable harm. 
Such negative consequences were highlighted in surveys and interviews.
What negative consequences, if any,  
do you foresee if cross-border legal challenges  
on the Internet are not properly addressed?
I N F O G R A P H I C  9
60%
Legal 
Uncertainty
54%
Loss of some key 
cross-border benefits 
of the Internet
52%
Compliance 
costs for online 
businesses
54%
Restrictions 
of expression
35%
Inability to address 
online abuses
SOURCE: Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network: Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019
When asked what, if any, negative consequences they foresee if cross-border legal challenges on the internet are not prop-
erly addressed, the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network’s stakeholders highlighted the following:
Top 5 answers by respondents
In their comments, surveyed experts also identified the lack of rules to govern conduct on the internet as a risk. As one sur-
veyed expert noted, as in every game with no rules, it is the strongest that will prevail.
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“The message was
clear that while  
a multistakeholder 
approach is still desired, 
the multistakeholder 
model is yet to be 
perfected.”
A multistakeholder
approach is still desired
1 . 1 0
The idea that internet governance requires joint management of internet 
resources by governments, business and civil society in their respective roles 
– i.e., multistakeholderism22 – remains the preferred approach to addressing 
cross-border challenges on the internet23.  This was a clear theme among 
surveyed and interviewed experts.
Many interviewed experts pointed to 
multistakeholder models currently op-
erating in certain spaces, such as gov-
ernments working with social media 
companies in a collaborative or coop-
erative approach to combat issues like 
child abuse material or extremist ac-
tivity online. Some specific examples 
cited include the activities of Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) and the associated 
Regional At-Large Organizations,24 the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)25 
and the Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF), including its regional initiatives.26 
However, interviewed experts consid-
ered that there must be more robust 
interaction across more areas. For ex-
ample, one interviewed expert said civil 
society and citizens must have a strong-
er voice in these discussions. Another 
interviewed expert stressed the impor-
tance of a multistakeholder model that 
incorporates industry agreement, as 
opposed to absolute oversight by gov-
ernment – an agile and flexible system 
that can allow issues to be addressed as 
they arise. 
Another expert commented that we are 
seeing threats or attempts to under-
mine the multistakeholder approach, 
particularly due to unilateral initiatives 
from governments and private sector 
actors driven by their own national or 
commercial interests.
Thus, the message was clear that while 
a multistakeholder approach is still de-
sired, the multistakeholder model is yet 
to be perfected.
Additionally, some interviewed experts 
pointed to an important gap in the 
widespread reliance on multistake-
holderism. Court decisions have a sig-
nificant impact across all cross-border 
legal issues on the internet. Yet by 
their nature, court decisions are not 
reached through any process that may 
be described as multistakeholderism. 
Typically, only parties to the dispute 
are in a position to present arguments 
22. See e.g.: UNESCO. (2017). What if we all governed the internet? Advancing multistakeholder participation in internet governance. Retrieved from  
https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/what_if_we_all_governed_internet_en.pdf. 
23. For a 2019 example, see: GSMA. Digital Declaration. Retrieved from https://www.gsma.com/betterfuture/digitaldeclaration.  
24. For example, the African Regional At-Large Organization, the Asian, Australasian and Pacific Islands Regional At-Large Organization, the 
European Regional At-Large Organization, the Latin American and Caribbean Islands Regional At-Large Organization and the North American 
Regional At-Large Organization.
25. World Wide Web Consortium. Retrieved from http://www.w3.org/Consortium/.  
26. For example, the Latin America and Caribbean IGF, East Africa IGF, Central Africa IGF, North Africa IGF, West Africa IGF, Central Asia IGF, Asia 
Pacific IGF and Arab IGF.
to courts. There is therefore an obvi-
ous risk that important interests are 
unrepresented at trials and overlooked 
by courts.
To address this weakness in the judi-
cial system, some courts allow the fil-
ing of so-called amicus curiae – ‘friend 
of the court’ – briefs. Courts have al-
lowed a large number of amicus briefs 
in some recent high-profile internet 
jurisdiction cases, such as the Micro-
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and What is at Stake?
In many ways, the challenges faced in 
the context of internet jurisdiction are 
akin to the challenges the world is fac-
ing in the context of climate change. 
Both challenges can only be addressed 
through cross-border cooperation and 
coordination, and both have a global 
impact that affects developing coun-
tries most acutely. Both challenges 
are also of a nature that might make 
individuals (and even individual states) 
feel unable to do anything of impact on 
their own to affect change.
Furthermore, one may argue that the 
online environment is now facing its 
own form of climate change. Like the 
‘tipping points’ that scientists have 
pointed to in the context of climate 
change, this Report highlights that if 
developments continue along the cur-
rent course, we will sooner or later 
reach similar tipping points at which the 
internet as we know it ceases to exist – 
and from which attempts at a reversal 
are potentially futile. But there are also 
important differences between the re-
spective crises unfolding in the natural 
environment and the online environ-
ment. For example, while short-term 
economic arguments are often levied 
against proposals for decisive action 
against climate change, there are few if 
any economic arguments against tack-
ling the cross-border legal challenges 
on the internet. On the contrary, deci-
sive action against the cross-border le-
gal challenges on the internet will also 
be rewarded economically in the short-
term, not just in the long-term. 
Furthermore, while there are still cli-
mate change deniers, few doubt or even 
question the very real negative impact 
of not addressing the cross-border legal 
challenges on the internet. More broad-
ly, while it has been suggested that some 
states prefer to operate with an unclear 
and chaotic legal framework regarding 
matters such as cyber espionage and 
cyber aggression, there are few that 
benefit from jurisdictional chaos and 
‘hyperregulation’ online. These latter 
points suggest that there ought to be 
a clear political will, and unquestioned 
economic and social justifications, to 
decisively tackle the challenges faced in 
the context of internet jurisdiction.
A pressing challenge, 
insufficiently addressed
1 . 1 1
The cross-border legal challenges facing the internet are currently getting 
more attention in media and in policy discussions than ever before. 
soft Warrant case27 heard in the US Su-
preme Court in February 2018.
Such accommodation of amicus briefs 
is an exception, however, and most 
courts avoid non-party input by: (1) 
not allowing amicus briefs at all, (2) 
adopting court rules that exclude 
amicus briefs in all but the most ex-
ceptional circumstances, or (3) inter-
preting the court rules restrictively 
to exclude non-party input. Restric-
tive approaches toward amicus briefs 
may be justified by the risk of delays 
and added costs. These are legitimate 
concerns, and courts are typically 
restrictive when it comes to amicus 
briefs filed by foreigners, in particular. 
At the same time, though, the stakes 
are often high for non-parties, as well, 
including foreign non-parties.28 In 
cases where courts feel empowered to 
make decisions with international im-
pact, one may argue that they should 
accept the responsibility of ensuring 
that they are sufficiently exposed to 
the international interests that stand 
to be impacted by their decisions.          
In light of the above, reform of the 
amicus curiae system is arguably the 
most urgently needed enhancement 
of multistakeholderism. 
27. Wikipedia. Microsoft Corp. v United States. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Corp._v._United_States.
28. Consider e.g., the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to amicus briefs in Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc.. Retrieved from https://www.
scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=36602. 
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First, some of the overarching trends 
relate to the changing technological 
landscape, which creates a need for 
‘future-proofing’ any legal or technical 
approaches we embark on today. In this 
context, there is a clear trend of erod-
ing borders between the online, da-
ta-driven world and the physical world, 
and there is an equally clear trend of 
continuing migration to the cloud.
Second, some of the overarching me-
ta-trends relate to the regulatory en-
vironment on the internet. While per-
haps a rudimentary observation, there 
is a clear trend of recognition that le-
gal regulation is necessary online – the 
question of whether to regulate or not 
is a ‘dead issue’. A proliferation of in-
itiatives signals that the cross-border 
legal challenges on the internet are 
being taken seriously, perhaps more 
so than ever before. Yet the measures 
taken suffer from a lack of coordina-
tion and cooperation. This only com-
pounds challenges arising from the 
trends of information overload and 
information access problems.
A third trend concerns serious at-
tempts at re-thinking the role of terri-
toriality for the regulation of the inter-
net, and an emerging political will to 
do so. Indeed, there is increasing rec-
ognition, in some settings, that territo-
riality is largely irrelevant. Lawmakers 
are also displaying a greater appetite 
for extending laws online, often in an 
‘extraterritorial’ manner that affects 
individuals, businesses and organiza-
tions overseas, or indeed other states; 
we may now be in an era of jurisdic-
tional ‘hyperregulation’. The increasing 
geographic reach of national laws may 
be seen as a natural response when na-
tional laws are the only tools to address 
transnational issues. Nevertheless, this 
trend is associated with several severe 
issues, including enforcement difficul-
ties, and there is some irony in that 
applying more laws transnationally will 
encourage more cooperation, because 
it is necessary for enforcement.
Fourth, there is a set of overarching 
trends that relate to normative plural-
ity, convergence and cross-fertiliza-
tion. Blurring the distinction between 
illegal content, content that violates 
terms of service and content that is 
objectionable has only augmented 
the diversity of normative sources. 
One trend observed in this context is 
a harmonization via company norms; 
another is judicial cross-fertilization 
driven by replication and imitation 
that does not always properly account 
for scalability issues. In this context, 
the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Net-
work’s stakeholders pointed to a trend 
of newer and smaller actors being 
bound by decisions from established 
and larger actors. 
A fifth trend pertains to the increased 
complexity around the role of inter-
net intermediaries. In some instanc-
es, these intermediaries are self-pro-
claimed gatekeepers; in others, they 
are involuntary gatekeepers. Some-
times, they are simply scapegoats and 
‘easy’ targets for litigation and content 
restriction orders. 
The combination of detailed desk research and 
stakeholder input – via the survey and interviews – drew 
attention to several overarching trends that are central 
to any discussion of the cross-border legal challenges 
on the internet. These overarching ‘meta-trends’ are 
shaping topical trends, and to a degree, they are setting 
the parameters within which the legal and technical 
approaches may be explored.
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A technological landscape 
in constant flux
2 . 1
This is true both online and offline. 
In the past, such developments were 
typically slow, gradual and relatively 
sporadic. In the online environment, 
however, major technological develop-
ments are fast, dramatic and numer-
ous. This puts significant stress on the 
law-making apparatus and demands a 
degree of future-proofing that goes far 
beyond what has historically been re-
quired. The preparedness for this task 
often appears limited in industrialized 
countries and is nearly absent in many 
developing countries. 
There is a necessary and constant interplay between law and technology, 
as developments in one sphere are likely to impact the other. 
02. Overarching Trends
2 . 1 . 1
The unification of online and physical worlds 
2 . 1 . 2
A continuing migration to the cloud 
One clear overarching trend is the fact 
that borders between the online, da-
ta-driven world and the physical world 
are eroding and becoming less clear, 
or even meaningless. This is an ongo-
ing process and not something new. 
People no longer ‘go online’ – they are 
constantly online. This has been the 
case for several years, in large part due 
to the uptake of smartphones.  
In the Internet of Things era, howev-
er, the speed with which these borders 
erode is increasing dramatically, with 
effects for all aspects of society. As 
one interviewed expert noted, the big 
data-driven companies we know from 
the online environment are increas-
ingly using their data-focused exper-
tise to expand into traditional indus-
tries in the physical world (self-driving 
cars are one example, but this trend 
extends far beyond that). By the same 
token, traditionally offline companies 
are increasingly repositioning them-
selves as data-driven companies, but 
may still lack the capacity to fully en-
gage with the breadth of cross-border 
jurisdictional issues because they are 
‘late to the party’. This raises several 
legal issues around competition, for 
example, and the abuse of dominant 
market positions, and we may have not 
yet seen the full picture of how it will 
impact cross-border legal challenges 
on the internet. 
As several interviewed experts point-
ed out, technology in this context acts 
not only as an object of regulation, but 
as a regulatory force itself. Indeed, it 
has long been recognized that tech-
nology competes with law as a regu-
latory force.29  
Put simply, cloud computing involves 
the on-demand provision of com-
puting resources over the internet.30 
In this area, a distinction is routinely 
drawn between infrastructure as a ser-
vice (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS) 
and software as a service (SaaS). All 
these forms of cloud computing have 
profound implications for cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet. 
Whether intentionally or not, cloud 
computing typically creates connect-
ing points to foreign jurisdictions in 
situations that may have previously 
been entirely domestic. Furthermore, 
cloud computing results in data being 
held by parties other than those who 
actually ‘own’ the data, which has con-
sequences in relation to data privacy 
law, for example, and the ability of law 
enforcement to access content needed 
as evidence.
Cloud computing, with its often highly 
fluid data flows, may make it difficult 
or even impossible31 to ascertain, in 
real time, where specific data is locat-
ed. This, in turn, severely undermines 
the usefulness of data location as a ju-
risdictional connecting factor or focal 
point. As argued recently by a US court, 
29. Lessig, L. (1999). The law of the horse: What cyberlaw might teach. Harvard Law Review, 113, 506.
30. See further: Millard, C. (Ed.). (2013). Cloud Computing Law. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press
31. In re Search Warrants Nos 16-960-M-01 and 16-1061-M to Google, para 7.
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when it is impossible to ascertain the 
location of data, it also becomes harder 
to argue that the sovereignty of a par-
ticular state was implicated when that 
data was accessed by a law enforce-
ment agency: “Even if the interference 
with a foreign state’s sovereignty is 
implicated, the fluid nature of Google’s 
cloud technology makes it uncertain 
which foreign country’s sovereignty 
would be implicated when Google ac-
cesses the content of communications 
in order to produce it in response to 
legal process.”32  
It is important, of course, to not con-
fuse the question of which state’s sov-
ereignty is being interfered with, and 
the question of whether any state’s sov-
ereignty is being interfered with. The 
court’s reasoning here may be accused 
of failing to recognize this distinction. 
Nevertheless, there is certainly some 
merit in the issue to which the court 
seeks to bring our attention.
While the study of cloud computing 
as a distinct regulatory or legal field 
seems to have declined, technological 
development is ongoing. Furthermore, 
states,33 businesses,34 and regions35 are 
still developing ways in which they use 
cloud computing, and not all attempts 
at establishing cloud computing ar-
rangements have been successful. One 
interviewed expert stressed that it is 
not only data that goes into the cloud. 
As massive amounts of software move 
into the cloud environment, ensuring 
control and security is a challenge, and 
security is not always built in from the 
start. Consequently, there is little doubt 
that cloud computing will continue to 
impact cross-border legal challenges 
on the internet as an overarching me-
ta-trend.
32. In re Search Warrants Nos 16-960-M-01 and 16-1061-M to Google, para 25.
33. Australian government. (2018). Australia’s Tech Future. Retrieved from https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-12/australias-tech-
future.pdf. 
34. Software One. Managing and understanding on-premises and cloud spend. Retrieved from https://www.softwareone.com/on-premises-and-
cloud-spend-survey/. 
35. See e.g., European Commission. Digital Single Market: Cloud Computing. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cloud. 
36. Johnson, D.R. & Post, D.G. (1996). Law and borders: The rise of law in cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 48, 1367; Reidenberg, J.R. (1998). Lex 
Informatica. Texas Law Review, 76(3), 553; Geist, M. (2001). Is there a there there? Towards greater certainty for internet jurisdiction. Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, 16, 1345; Menthe, D.C. (1998). Jurisdiction in cyberspace: A theory of international spaces. Michigan Technology Law 
Review, 4(1), 69; and Goldsmith, J.L. (1998). Against cyberanarchy. University of Chicago Law Review, 65(4), 1250.
Regulation: not if, but how
2 . 2
It is useful to distinguish between regulation of the internet, 
on the one hand, and regulation on the internet, on the other. 
The latter is now primarily in focus.
2 . 2 . 1
To regulate or not is not the issue
During the 1990s, a debate raged about 
whether it was possible to regulate Cy-
berspace, and whether it was even de-
sirable to do so. This debate took place 
on several levels; in policy circles and 
in academia, and domestically and in-
ternationally among the comparative-
ly limited number of states that were 
active online at that time. In the aca-
demic arena, key contributions to the 
English-language debate were made 
by several prominent North American 
scholars.36 
Most famously, in the policy context, 
1996 saw Barlow present his well-
known Declaration of the Independence 
of Cyberspace, which captured the 
spirit of the time:
“Governments of the Industrial World, 
you weary giants of flesh and steel, I 
come from Cyberspace, the new home 
of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask 
you of the past to leave us alone. You 
are not welcome among us. You have 
no sovereignty where we gather. […] 
You have no moral right to rule us nor 
do you possess any methods of en-
forcement we have true reason to fear. 
[…] Cyberspace does not lie within 
your borders. […] Ours is a world that 
“It is generally 
recognized that there 
is a need for legal 
regulation for many 
of the things done 
online.”
is both everywhere and nowhere, but 
it is not where bodies live. […] Your le-
gal concepts of property, expression, 
identity, movement, and context do 
not apply to us. […] Our identities may 
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be distributed across many of your ju-
risdictions. The only law that all our 
constituent cultures would generally 
recognize is the Golden Rule. We hope 
we will be able to build our particular 
solutions on that basis. But we cannot 
accept the solutions you are attempt-
ing to impose.”37
While some of these thoughts may 
seem to belong to a bygone era today, 
other aspects are clearly still relevant 
— perhaps more as an explanation of 
the regulatory issues the ecosystem 
still faces today, rather than a mani-
festo. Sovereignty and enforcement 
remain complex and controversial 
issues. Cyberspace may be less ‘bor-
derless’ now than it was then, but the 
clash between laws grounded in terri-
toriality and a prima facie borderless, 
virtually global internet remains. Fur-
thermore, some legal concepts are still 
difficult to transpose onto the online 
environment.   
Nevertheless, questions of whether 
it is possible (or desirable) to regulate 
cyberspace are now ‘dead issues’. It is 
generally recognized that there is a 
need for legal regulation for many on-
line activities. For example, few would 
accept the idea of an online environ-
ment where laws against child abuse-
materials do not apply. Consumers are 
less likely to engage in e-commerce if 
they are not afforded protection, and 
data privacy protection is at least as im-
portant online as it is offline. The fact 
that legal regulation plays an important 
role online is an important overarching 
meta-trend that affects every aspect 
of the topical trends, and the legal and 
technical approaches.
Nevertheless, the areas in relation to 
which the ecosystem relies on legal 
regulation are not necessarily static. As 
discussed in more detail below, while 
law is largely relied upon to create trust 
in online commercial transactions to-
day, blockchain-based smart contracts 
may increasingly act as a competitor in 
some areas – even if the law remains an 
underlying facilitator of the trust creat-
ed by smart contracts.
Meanwhile, while the applicability of 
law online is now firmly established, the 
era of so-called self-regulation is by no 
means over. Ultimately, regulating the 
internet requires a steady hand and a 
A plethora of new initiatives from pub-
lic and private actors around the world 
have been announced or adopted to 
address the issues at stake. These 
include new national laws, codes of 
conduct, multilateral agreements and 
company policies. Many of these in-
itiatives are discussed in the Chapter 
that outlines key topical trends, and in 
the Chapter that analyzes a range of 
legal and technical approaches. 
Intensive developments on cross-bor-
der legal challenges online signal that 
these issues are now taken seriously, 
which is certainly important. Yet un-
coordinated patching actions, taken in 
a reactive mode under the pressure of 
urgency, create a legal arms race with 
potentially detrimental impacts. En-
suring that the multiplication of differ-
ent regimes does not create additional 
tensions, or even conflicts, is a major 
challenge.
The degree to which states seek to ap-
ply their laws to internet activities has 
not been static over the years. In fact, it 
is possible to identify a pattern of pen-
dulum swings between what may be 
described as jurisdictional under-reg-
ulation on one side, and jurisdictional 
over-regulation on the other.38
Today, the regulatory environment is 
clearly swinging toward jurisdictional 
over-regulation. Indeed, the appetite 
with which states are now seeking to 
extend their jurisdiction and apply 
their laws to internet activities is un-
precedented. Thus, one may speak of 
this as an era of jurisdictional ‘hyper-
regulation’ characterized by the fol-
lowing conditions: 
1.  the complexity of a party’s contex-
tual legal system (i.e., the combina-
tion of all laws that purport to ap-
ply to that party in a given matter) 
amounts to an insurmountable ob-
stacle to legal compliance; and 
Self-regulation has played a major role 
in the development of the internet and 
can occur on a variety of levels, ranging 
from infrastructure governance to 
peer-driven content moderation within 
a specific online forum. The domain 
name system is often cited as a prime 
example of successful self-regulation.
As another example, one interviewed  
expert cited the self-regulation of  
counter-terrorism measures on the 
internet, as opposed to externally 
imposed rules. More broadly, another 
interviewed expert stressed the need for 
international agreement on standards 
of jurisdiction on the internet, because 
while companies should be encouraged 
to self-regulate, governments need to 
take responsibility, as well.
It is possible, however, that the wind 
is changing on self-regulation of 
companies (even in the US). Indeed, 
ICANN today could be seen as more of 
a hybrid organization, as governments 
play an increased role in its regulation.
Self-regulation
37. Barlow, J.P. (1996). A declaration of the independence of cyberspace. Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved from 
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
38. See further: Svantesson, D. (2017). Solving the internet jurisdiction puzzle. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 91-112.
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Proliferation of initiatives
dispassionate mind. History has already 
proven that both inaction and over-ac-
tion may be harmful for this sensitive 
and indeed fragile environment.
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2.  the risk of legal enforcement of (at 
least parts of) the laws that make up 
the contextual legal system is more 
than a theoretical possibility.
One interviewed expert emphasized 
that governments are now seeking to 
control the online environment, which 
results in the creation of more laws, as 
their typical response is to introduce 
new laws rather than apply existing 
laws to confront the challenges. 
A related trend is the fast pace at which 
political agendas and policy focuses 
change. For example, various online 
issues that gained limited attention 
just some years ago, such as online 
bullying, the spread of hate speech and 
non-consensual distribution of sex-
ually explicit content, are now widely 
recognized as problems. The constant 
shifting of priorities and attention from 
one topic to another, often spurred 
by the news media, creates a sense of 
urgency that leaves governments with 
insufficient time to decide on or coor-
dinate approaches. 
Increased regulation of cyberspace: 
problem or solution?
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Some interviewed experts noted that 
although governments in the past 
largely took the view that internet reg-
ulation was difficult or impossible, the 
political will to regulate the internet is 
now stronger than ever. 
Just over half of surveyed experts indi-
cated that they see this development as 
both part of the problem and part of the 
solution. In more detail, 55 % indicated 
that the increase in the enforcement of 
national laws in cases involving servers, 
users or companies located in other 
countries is both part of the problem 
and part of the solution. 28% saw it as 
just part of the problem, while 15% saw 
it as just part of the solution. 2% saw 
the increase in the enforcement of na-
tional laws in cases involving servers, 
users or companies located in other 
countries as being neither part of the 
problem nor part of the solution.
2 . 2 . 3
An increasing appetite to regulate cyberspace
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To move forward on the cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet 
in the most successful way possible, 
all stakeholders must have access to 
relevant information. Indeed, this is 
one of the reasons for this Report. 
The need for capacity building was a 
recurring theme in comments from 
surveyed and interviewed experts, and 
it is relevant in this context, as well. 
For example, one interviewed expert 
commented on the importance of de-
veloping a new way to educate policy 
makers, regulators and others so that 
the discussion remains robust in terms 
of legal tradition, but in a way that can 
be readily understood to prevent these 
stakeholders from ‘switching off’.  In-
terviewed experts from the tech sec-
tor made similar comments on capac-
ity building, with some stressing the 
need for legislators and law enforce-
ment to understand the technology 
and terminology. 
Some interviewed experts pointed 
to the strong dominance of the Eng-
lish language as a current problem in 
the context of accessing information, 
noting that the cost of translations is 
a limiting factor. However, it was also 
noted that this current barrier is likely 
to decline, as younger generations in 
many states have high levels of English 
proficiency. One interviewed expert 
made the important observation that 
materials only being available in a for-
eign language forces reliance on brief 
secondary sources, which often lack 
nuance and are written for a generalist 
audience. This reality plagues all stake-
holder groups and is also legitimate 
concern in relation to some of the ma-
terials relied upon for this Report.
One surveyed expert stated that in-
formation was accessed mainly on 
a regional scale. Another noted that 
although there is substantial infor-
mation available about decisions in 
the US and Europe, there is not much 
information about decisions and de-
velopments in other states — including 
their rationale, their laws and the in-
terpretation of those laws. This could 
be seen as a call for states around the 
world to do more to provide and pro-
mote free online access to their laws 
and court decisions, preferably with 
key developments accessible in multi-
ple languages. 
This observation is also of interest in 
relation to the widespread lack of is-
sues and examples from other regions 
(outside the EU and US) in discussions 
of cross-border legal challenges on the 
internet – a problem strongly empha-
sized by numerous interviewed and 
2 . 2 . 4
Information overload and accessibility
surveyed experts. Surveyed and inter-
viewed experts noted that much is be-
ing done to ensure regional diversity in 
the discussions, including greater rep-
resentation from developing countries. 
Yet one may reasonably assume that 
part of the problem stems from EU/US 
developments becoming the common 
denominator in the discussions, part-
ly due to their accessibility. As a result, 
these developments garner greater 
attention at the expense of examples 
from other regions, even when those 
regions are represented in discussions.
“To move forward 
on the cross-border 
legal challenges on 
the internet in the 
most successful 
way possible, all 
stakeholders must 
have access to 
relevant information.”
In their comments, surveyed experts 
expressed concerns around the in-
creased enforcement of national laws 
in cases involving servers, users or 
companies located in other coun-
tries. In particular, surveyed experts 
pointed to concerns about arbitrar-
iness, uncertainty, unintended con-
sequences, inappropriate impact in 
third-countries, and a tension be-
tween state priorities and a global 
vision. Others noted that while ad-
herence to treaties would be ideal, in 
its absence, extraterritorial national 
laws – if properly implemented – are 
a sensible interim solution. Some also 
argued that unilateral attempts high-
light weaknesses in existing regimes, 
and as such, work as an inevitable cat-
alyst for long-term change.  
There were clear sectoral differences 
on this survey question, with stake-
holders from the government sector 
and international organizations being 
considerably more positive about this 
development. 
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Numerous surveyed and interviewed experts pointed 
to the I&J Retrospect Database of the Internet & 
Jurisdiction Policy Network as a leading source of 
information on the relevant actors and initiatives, the 
details of relevant laws and their application, as well as 
the relevant court decisions in the topic of cross-border 
legal challenges on the internet.
However, the wide variance in access to materials 
from different regions is also reflected in the Internet & 
Jurisdiction Policy Network’s Retrospect Database.39  For 
example, an examination of the reported cases during 
the year of 2018 – 240 in total – reveal the following 
statistics:
•  95 of these deal exclusively with Europe, and another 
12 involve Europe plus at least one other jurisdiction;
•  28 cases deal exclusively with North America, and 
another 12 involve North America plus at least one 
other jurisdiction;
•  19 cases are geographically neutral;
•  17 cases deal exclusively with Asia (apart from China, 
India and Russia), and another 1 involves Asia (apart 
from China, India and Russia) plus at least one other 
jurisdiction;
•  14 cases deal exclusively with Russia, and another 1 
involves Russia plus at least one other jurisdiction;
•  10 cases deal exclusively with India, and another 1 
involves India plus at least one other jurisdiction;
•  9 cases deal exclusively with South America, and 
another 2 involve South America plus at least one 
other jurisdiction;
•  8  cases deal exclusively with Australia/New Zealand, 
and another 2 involve Australia/New Zealand plus at 
least one other jurisdiction;
•  9 cases deal exclusively with China;
•  9 cases deal exclusively with Africa; and
•  7 cases deal exclusively with the Middle East, and 
another 1 involves the Middle East plus at least one 
other jurisdiction.
While the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network’s 
Retrospect database is clearly intended to capture 
information from around the world, the dominance of 
European materials is nevertheless overwhelming. This 
highlights the need for more and better information 
sharing, and points to the usefulness of future regional 
reports. 
Variance in access to  
materials from different regions 
39. Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network. I&J Retrospect Database. Retrieved from https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect
40.  Zippo Manufacturing Company v Zippo Dot Com, Inc 952 F.Supp 1119 (WD Pa 1997).
41. Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575. For a recent discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in relation to the 
internet, see: Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, 2018 2 S.C.R. 3.
In this context, it is worth emphasiz-
ing the point that information sharing 
equals impact. For example, if a person 
from South America meets someone 
from Asia and neither knows much 
about the other’s laws and approaches, 
but both have a basic understanding 
of European and North American ap-
proaches, they are perhaps likely to 
base their discussion on the common 
knowledge they share. This results in 
a ‘disproportionate’ influence of Euro-
pean and North American law, which is 
a key issue for both capacity building 
and inclusiveness.
2 . 2 . 5
Every problem has a solution, but every solution has a problem
While one may argue that judicial and 
legislative creativity has declined over 
recent years, some solutions have 
been advanced to address the compli-
cations regarding the establishment of 
a court’s personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant in another territory. Many 
will recall, for example, the ‘sliding 
scale’ test articulated by US courts in 
the mid-1990s, which sought to or-
ganize websites by reference to their 
‘interactivity’.40 And in the famous 
High Court of Australia case in 2002 
between US publishing company Dow 
Jones and Victorian businessman Gut-
nick – which marked the first time 
that the highest court of any state 
considered the matter of jurisdiction 
over cross-border internet defamation 
– Justice Kirby determined that the 
solution was found in the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens.41  
These solutions, like many others, 
have not stood the test of time. But the 
judicial self-restraint that Justice Kirby 
anticipated in the form of forum non 
conveniens is still frequently cited as a 
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potential solution, even though court 
attitudes toward jurisdiction appear 
to be moving away from self-restraint. 
Few proposed solutions are therefore 
truly ‘new’, and focusing on wheth-
er they are or not is arguably not the 
most fruitful approach. More impor-
tant is how well a given solution ad-
dresses the concerns at hand.
The reality is that jurisdictional issues 
both online and offline are complex, 
and in light of the attempts at finding 
solutions so far, it seems clear that 
perfect solutions are improbable; in-
deed, the search for perfection can 
become an obstacle to progress. And 
given that the world is increasingly 
characterized by complexity, arriving 
at an all-encompassing international 
treaty to solve the myriad cross-bor-
der legal challenges online is highly 
unlikely within the foreseeable and 
even distant future. 
Rather than waiting for the problems 
to go away, or to be resolved through 
an unlikely international treaty, stake-
holders need to continue working on 
many different fronts, and ensure that 
their work is as coordinated as possi-
ble. Such work should also be ground-
ed in solid conceptual frameworks – a 
component that is typically provided 
by academic research.
Yet despite the central role that the 
internet plays in modern society, and 
despite its increasing prominence in 
policy discussions, cross-border le-
gal challenges on the internet are still 
treated as fringe issues in legal aca-
demic literature – not least within the 
fields of public and private internation-
al law. This is untenable. Cross-border 
internet-related legal issues are cen-
tral matters in society today, and this 
must be reflected in public and private 
international law discussions.
Regrettably, it appears that the legal 
issues of internet jurisdiction are re-
ceiving less attention in legal academic 
literature.
42. This study is based on a text search for journal articles either containing at least one sentence with both the term “internet” and the term 
“jurisdiction”, or at least one sentence with both the term “Cyberspace” and the term “jurisdiction” (i.e. (Cyberspace /s jurisdiction) OR (Internet /s 
jurisdiction)). The searches were carried out on 7 January 2019 on the Law Journal Library of HeinOnline. The search was limited to the following 
categories: “Articles”, “Comments”, “Notes” and “Editorials”, and included “external articles (articles outside of HeinOnline)” as well as “periodical results 
from other HeinOnline Collections”. This approach admittedly has its limitations. Nevertheless, the result is indicative of the development in academic 
law journal articles, comments, notes and editorials addressing the topic of internet jurisdiction. 
43. Result produced via the following search: (Cyberspace OR Internet). The searches were carried out on 7 January 2019 on the Law Journal Library of 
HeinOnline. The search was limited to the following categories: “Articles”, “Comments”, “Notes” and “Editorials”, and included “external articles (articles 
outside of HeinOnline)” as well as “periodical results from other HeinOnline Collections”.
Jurisdictional issues represent a decreasing proportion of academic work
Year 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2013 2014-2018
Number of 
journal articles 
addressing the 
legal issues 
of internet 
jurisdiction42
841 1,997 1,451 1,501 1,281
Number of 
journal articles 
addressing 
the internet43
13,762 31,646 34,680 39,392 37,981
Percentage of 
journal articles 
addressing the 
legal issues 
of internet 
jurisdiction 
out of total 
number of 
journal articles 
addressing 
the internet
6.1% 6.3% 4.2% 3.8% 3.4%
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Cross-border legal challenges arise 
within virtually all areas of substantive 
law and are often approached and de-
bated within the context of each area. 
For example, these challenges may be 
discussed in the context of reforming 
intellectual property law, defamation 
law, cybercrime or taxation. 
Yet it is also important to recognize 
that one can approach the cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet 
as a topic in its own right, and not 
merely as a component of different 
substantive law areas. Doing so re-
veals the extent to which identical or 
similar jurisdictional challenges arise 
in different settings, allowing solutions 
and approaches from one context to 
be transposed to another. More such 
‘meta-level’ work is needed in this area.
2 . 2 . 6
Legal uncertainy increases
The activities of both natural persons 
(individuals) and legal persons (com-
panies and other organizations) are 
regulated by law. In the offline envi-
ronment, it is typically quite easy to 
identify the applicable law. For exam-
ple, a person driving a car on roads in 
Germany is subject to German traffic 
rules. Identifying the applicable law(s) 
online is often more complicated.
When sending an email from Argentina 
to Japan, for example, a person may be 
subject to both the laws of Argentina 
and those of Japan. However, when 
the same person in Argentina posts a 
defamatory comment about a person 
in Finland to a social media site, she 
may be subject to not only the laws 
of Argentina and Finland, but the laws 
of all the countries in which she has 
contacts in her social media network 
– and perhaps any law specified in her 
agreement with the social media plat-
form. As this example shows, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that applicable 
laws are determined by the activities 
we undertake. 
To understand the complications that 
arise, it is useful to think of the laws 
that apply to a person in a given sit-
uation as a ‘contextual legal system’ 
– that is, a system of legal rules from 
different states that all apply to the 
activity undertaken by that person. It 
is then clear that, in the example in-
volving an email sent from Argentina 
to Japan, the contextual legal system is 
less complex (because it consists of the 
legal rules of two states) than that of 
the latter example involving a defama-
tory social media posting.  
A serious problem online is that peo-
ple are often unable to predict all the 
states’ laws that form part of their con-
textual legal system for any given ac-
tivity. Even when a person can ascer-
tain which states’ laws apply to them, 
it is not always easy to access all those 
laws. Indeed, even where access can 
be ensured, language issues may miti-
gate a full understanding of those laws. 
In addition, the legal rules of a domes-
tic legal system are typically struc-
tured to avoid situations where one 
legal rule demands something that 
another legal rule prohibits. However, 
where a contextual legal system con-
sists of legal rules from different states 
– as is typically the case in relation to 
online activities – no such coordina-
tion can be presumed. As a result, it is 
not uncommon, online, for one legal 
rule within a relevant contextual legal 
system to require something that an-
other legal rule within the same sys-
tem prohibits. This lack of legal har-
monization, while natural in light of 
how the world is organized, is a major 
hurdle, as it creates an environment 
in which ensuring legal compliance is 
difficult, or even impossible. 
This poses obvious practical challeng-
es. On a deeper level, it also under-
mines the legitimacy of at least one 
fundamental legal principle: the prin-
ciple that ignorance of the law excus-
es not (‘Ignorantia juris non excusat’), 
which is a cornerstone of any func-
tioning legal system. If one acknowl-
edges that the regulatory environment 
online makes it frequently impossible 
to be informed of one’s legal obliga-
tions, it is difficult to maintain that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
For now, the general impossibility of 
knowing all the laws that purport to 
apply, and the fact that ignorance of 
the law is typically no excuse, seem 
irreconcilable, affecting both the top-
ical trends, and the legal and technical 
approaches.
“A serious problem 
online is that people 
are often unable to 
predict all the states’ 
laws that form part of 
their contextual legal 
system for any given 
activity. Even when a 
person can ascertain 
which states’ laws 
apply to them, it is 
not always easy to 
access all those laws.”
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Rethinking the role of territoriality
2 . 3
In relation to the matter of jurisdiction, territoriality is essentially meant 
to fulfil two functions. The first is to provide a criterion for when a state 
can claim jurisdiction. Online, however, it is particularly easy to find 
territorial anchor-points for jurisdictional claims. The second function 
of territoriality is to act as a ‘stop sign’ that provides a warning when 
one enters the exclusive domain of another state. 
Here again, though, territoriality fails 
online.  It is simply unrealistic to think 
that a state will be connected to the 
global community and still enjoy tra-
ditional exclusiveness, in the West-
phalian sense.
In fact, it seems increasingly obvious 
that drawing a distinction between 
territorial and extraterritorial juris-
dictional claims is misguided. This is 
because:
1.  There is no (international) agree-
ment on when a claim of jurisdic-
tion is extraterritorial (which, as-
suming that extraterritorial is the 
opposite of territorial, logically 
precludes any agreement on when 
a claim of jurisdiction is territorial); 
and
2.  Some ‘extraterritorial’ claims of ju-
risdiction are clearly supported in 
international law, as is the case, for 
example, under the nationality prin-
ciple. In fact, exceptions to a strict 
adherence to territoriality are now 
so numerous that territoriality can 
no longer be seen as the jurispru-
dential foundation for jurisdiction. 
Even where a jurisdictional rule is 
drafted in terms of territorial criteria, 
its true underlying aim is to establish 
whether the state making the jurisdic-
tional claim has a sufficiently strong 
connection to the matter to create a 
legitimate interest in claiming juris-
diction; a territorial criterion is mere-
ly a proxy for this underlying aim. For 
example, while Article 3 of the GDPR 
purports to delineate the GDPR’s 
scope of application in a spatial sense, 
it actually does so in a manner that is 
both territoriality-dependent and ter-
ritoriality-independent. Thus, to speak 
of extraterritoriality is akin to describ-
ing cars as ‘horseless carriages’ – both 
descriptions are founded in a mistaken 
notion of what is ‘normal’. Although 
the term is still used for the sake of 
convenience, we must be aware that 
extraterritoriality, as a concept, has 
been discredited.44
It is well established and beyond intel-
ligent dispute that international law’s 
focus on territoriality is a bad fit with 
the fluidity of the online environment, 
which is characterized by constant 
and substantial cross-border interac-
tion. Yet until recently, little had been 
done, and even less achieved, in the 
pursuit of disentangling internet juris-
diction from territoriality. 
In policy documents and academic writ-
ings, the most commonly cited source 
for a territoriality focus is the classic 
Lotus case45,  which was decided by the 
then-Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1927. This case involved a col-
lision between two steamships. 
While principles articulated in one 
setting may legitimately be applied to 
cases in other settings, cases concern-
44. See further: Ryngaert, C. (2015) Jurisdiction in International Law 2nd edn. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, p. 8.
45. Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Series A, No. 10, p. 21.
46. Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Series A, No. 10, p. 21.
“Rather than 
conceding that the 
absence of relevant 
case law means that 
this is an unsettled 
area of law, there 
has been a tendency 
to inappropriately 
overemphasize the 
Lotus decision.”
ing colliding steamships clearly differ 
from those in the context of internet 
jurisdiction. Given that general legal 
methods call for treating different 
cases differently, there seems to be 
little point in grounding our thinking 
on internet jurisdiction in the Lotus 
decision. In fact, the majority opinion 
in Lotus emphasized the need to focus 
on “precedents offering a close anal-
ogy to the case under consideration; 
for it is only from precedents of this 
nature that the existence of a general 
principle applicable to the particular 
case may appear.”46  
Perhaps the real reason that the Lotus 
decision still receives so much atten-
tion is the fact that there are so few 
other international decisions on this 
topic. Rather than conceding that the 
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absence of relevant case law means that 
this is an unsettled area of law, there 
has been a tendency to inappropriately 
overemphasize the Lotus decision. 
Moreover, the Lotus judgment is not 
a particularly solid foundation for the 
territoriality principle, because it con-
tains contradictions and lacks clarity in 
some areas. It is also a decision in which 
no less than half of the members of the 
court expressed a dissenting opinion, 
and there is not even any agreement 
as to what type of jurisdiction – pre-
scriptive, judicial or enforcement – the 
Lotus case involved. 
As the role of strict territoriality de-
clines in the context of jurisdiction, 
something else must take its place as 
the jurisprudential core of jurisdic-
tional claims. In the context of law en-
forcement access to digital evidence, 
at least, there are signs of an emerg-
ing consensus to focus on whether the 
state claiming jurisdiction has a legiti-
mate interest and a substantial connec-
tion to the matter at hand, combined 
with an assessment of the considera-
tion of other interests.47  Discussions 
regarding the cross-border legal issues 
associated with law enforcement ac-
cess to digital evidence are relatively 
advanced, and as one interviewed ex-
pert noted, this field is a major driver 
in cross-border legal issues. Reliance 
on this three-factor framework may 
therefore spread, as it can also be ap-
plied in other settings in which stand-
ards need to be imposed on claims of 
jurisdiction.48  
Focusing on whether the state claim-
ing jurisdiction has a legitimate in-
terest and a substantial connection 
to the matter at hand, combined with 
an assessment of the consideration of 
other interests, has the advantage of 
incorporating a wide range of com-
plex international law concepts, while 
also being easily understandable. This 
user-friendliness makes it an effective 
tool to overcome some of the ‘artifi-
cial regulatory challenges’ associated 
with cross-border legal issues on the 
internet. It further benefits from be-
ing relevant for both matters that tra-
ditionally fall within public interna-
tional law and those that traditionally 
fall within private international law (or 
conflict of laws). 
47. These ‘other interests’ may include the interests of individuals, see e.g., the work of Ireland-Piper regarding whether the ‘abuse of rights’ 
doctrine might be helpful in seeking to maintain an appropriate balance between the rights of states and of individuals (Ireland-Piper, D. (2017) 
Accountability in Extraterritoriality. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar).
48. See further: Svantesson, D. (2017). Solving the internet jurisdiction puzzle. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 57-90.
49. For examples of attempts at constructing such tools, see e.g., Svantesson, D. (2013). A ‘layered approach’ to the extraterritoriality of data 
privacy laws. International Data Privacy Law, 3(4), 278-286; and Svantesson, D. (2017). Solving the internet jurisdiction puzzle. Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 171-189 outlining a framework for ‘scope of jurisdiction’.
2 . 3 . 1
An increasing geographic reach of national laws
When jurisdictional rules are broad in 
scope, they risk capturing conduct with 
which there is an insufficient degree of 
contact to justify a state’s jurisdiction-
al claim. This may lead to jurisdiction 
being exercised over parties that lack 
adequate notice. At the same time, 
when jurisdictional rules are narrow in 
scope, they risk leaving victims without 
judicial redress. Striking the right bal-
ance is no easy task, and focusing on 
distinctions between territoriality and 
extraterritoriality frequently leads to 
both of these problems.
Many states make broad claims of 
jurisdiction over internet activities – 
claims that they cannot possibly back 
up with effective enforcement. While 
common, such ‘jurisdictional trawling’ 
is often a destructive regulatory ap-
proach, especially when it leads to ar-
bitrary enforcement, which, as inter-
viewed experts emphasized, is a poor 
fit with the rule of law.
In addition, as states compete to have 
their laws respected, many are in-
creasing the potential fines for those 
who fail to comply. This is problematic 
in instances where compliance with 
one state’s law necessitates the viola-
tion of another state’s law. 
The aforementioned ‘jurisdictional 
trawling’ and high potential fines are 
merely two examples of states flexing 
their muscles in relation to the internet.
Comparing the issue of jurisdiction 
online and offline, arguably the biggest 
difference is that for online jurisdic-
tion, there is a greater need to link the 
question of whether a claim of jurisdic-
tion is appropriate with the question of 
over what jurisdiction is asserted. Put 
differently, it is harder in the online 
context to determine which aspects of 
a legal or natural person’s activity are 
captured by a claim of jurisdiction and 
which are not. This is a topic that has 
so far gained little attention, and there 
is a clear need for more sophisticated 
tools to ensure that claims of jurisdic-
tion are not broader than necessary to 
accomplish lawmakers’ goals.49
Yet perhaps the biggest challenge re-
lates to trying to change attitudes. Too 
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often, the aim of the rules of jurisdic-
tion is understood to merely be to fur-
ther the policy objectives of relevant 
substantive laws. For example, if defa-
mation law aims to protect the reputa-
tion of individuals, the aim of relevant 
jurisdictional rules is perceived to be 
to make the substantive defamation 
law as widely enforceable as possible 
by extending the claim of jurisdiction 
globally. But this is too simplistic. The 
underlying role of rules of jurisdiction 
must always be to seek the effective 
enforcement of the relevant substan-
tive law, while at the same time min-
imizing, or even avoiding, the risk of 
international tension and conflict.
2 . 3 . 2
Challenges of enforceability
It is easy to understand why states 
want their laws to be respected online 
in the same way they are respected 
offline. Indeed, as the world is struc-
tured today, each state may be under-
stood to have the right to dictate what 
is available online in that state. At the 
same time, despite the obvious legiti-
macy of their ambition for online and 
offline legal parity, there are several 
other considerations that should be 
part of the equation. 
First, merely claiming that a state’s 
laws apply worldwide online does not 
make it so. International law imposes 
some restrictions – albeit vague ones – 
on when a state can claim that its laws 
apply. Furthermore, a state’s ability to 
enforce its laws is often more limited 
than the claims it makes regarding the 
reach of its laws.
Second, as states make broader ju-
risdictional claims, they may become 
increasingly dependent on the co-
operation of other states for the en-
forcement of those claims. Therefore, 
although broader claims of jurisdic-
tion may lead to obvious clashes in 
some cases, they may also encourage 
greater cooperation and coordination 
among states.
Any potential positive impact of 
broader jurisdictional claims may be 
lost when states are content to lim-
it themselves to what may be termed 
‘domestic enforcement of extraterrito-
rial claims’. Rather than relying on en-
forcement through the cooperation by 
a foreign state, states, in this scenario 
impose ‘market destroying measures’ 
on the foreign party, such as restrict-
ing that party’s access to users in the 
country in question.50 Such exercises 
of ‘market sovereignty’ are seemingly 
increasing in frequency. 
Third, where a state makes the claim 
that its laws apply to certain online ac-
tivities, it needs to be prepared to ac-
cept equally broad claims from other 
states.   
Fourth, jurisdictional hyper-regulation 
imposes a significant cost of compli-
ance on all natural and legal persons 
who seek to abide by all applicable laws. 
Fifth, there is a risk that natural and 
legal persons who seek to abide by all 
applicable laws adhere to the strictest 
standards, under the logic that com-
pliance with the strictest standards 
ensures compliance with all relevant 
laws. Such a ‘race to the bottom’ may 
have irreversible consequences for di-
versity online. 
Taken together, these considerations 
suggest that the legitimate aim of hav-
ing state laws respected online in the 
same way as offline must be pursued 
in a careful and intelligent manner. In 
our current era of jurisdictional hy-
per-regulation, there is a clear me-
ta-trend of states making overly broad 
and unsophisticated claims of juris-
50. See further: Svantesson, D. (2016). Private international law and the internet (3rd ed.). Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, pp. 11-12.
“As states make 
broader jurisdictional 
claims, they may 
become increasingly 
dependent on the 
cooperation of 
other states for the 
enforcement of those 
claims. Therefore, 
although broader 
claims of jurisdiction 
may lead to obvious 
clashes in some 
cases, they may also 
encourage greater 
cooperation and 
coordination among 
states.”  
diction where more limited, intelligent 
and nuanced claims of jurisdiction 
would: 
1.  be easier to defend both morally 
and under international law; 
2. be easier to enforce; 
3. impose lower compliance costs; and 
4.  be less likely to encourage overly 
broad claims of jurisdiction by other 
states.
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2 . 3 . 3
When territoriality is irrelevant
2 . 4 . 1
Blurring of categories 
Given the above, it is only natural that 
we have seen a slow but steady decline 
in the focus on territoriality for juris-
dictional purposes. As discussed in a 
later Chapter, some recent examples 
of this include the 2018 US CLOUD 
Act;  the EU’s Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down harmonized rules 
on the appointment of legal represent-
atives for the purpose of gathering ev-
idence in criminal proceedings51;  and 
the EU’s Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the 
Council on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic ev-
idence in criminal matters.52 Further, 
Article 3(1) of the EU’s GDPR specifi-
cally emphasizes that the location of 
data processing is irrelevant.  With 
these instruments, the EU and US are 
shifting their focus away from the lo-
cation of the data in question, and 
from territoriality more broadly.
The shift away from blind adherence 
to territoriality as the foundation of ju-
risdiction must be understood in light 
of the fact that territoriality-based 
thinking encourages data localization, 
and fragmentation more broadly. Fur-
thermore, territoriality, as a concept, 
suffers from several weaknesses, espe-
cially when applied in online contexts 
where determining the location of a 
specific activity necessitates entering 
the quagmire of legal fictions. 
At the same time, it should be noted 
that difficulties in applying the concept 
of territoriality are by no means lim-
ited to the online environment. Such 
“Jurisdiction, as 
a jurisprudential 
concept, is not rooted 
in territoriality.”
51. COM(2018) 226 final. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0226&from=EN. 
52. COM(2018) 225 final. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0225&from=EN. 
53. See e.g.: Lessig, L. (1999). The law of the horse: What cyberlaw might teach. Harvard Law Review 113(506).
difficulties are also common offline, 
particularly in fields such as human 
rights law, aviation law and anti-com-
petition law. It is time to recognize that 
what are normally discussed as ‘excep-
tions’ to the territoriality principle are 
too numerous, and too important, to 
be seen as mere exceptions. These ex-
ceptions must instead be recognized 
for what they really are: indicators that 
jurisdiction, as a jurisprudential con-
cept, is not rooted in territoriality. 
Normative plurality, convergence 
and cross-fertilization
2 . 4
It is a well-established fact that law is not the only factor affecting 
conduct online.53 Indeed, law does not always have the greatest effect on 
conduct online. This has profound implications.
Interviewed experts noted that there 
is sometimes a fine line between le-
gitimate political speech on the one 
hand, and hate speech or defamatory 
content on the other. Some measures 
aimed at removing the latter risk sup-
pressing the former. One interviewed 
expert also observed that there is no 
broad agreement on norms, behaviors 
and types of content that are univer-
sally acceptable. The international 
differences are great; content may be 
classified as hate speech in one juris-
diction, for example, while it may be 
classified as acceptable in another. 
Interviewed experts underscored this 
point by drawing a comparison be-
tween how the US and Germany treat 
hate speech.
In a 2012 Report, the UN Special Rap-
porteur on Freedom of Expression 
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pointed to three different types of 
expression: (1) expression that consti-
tutes an offense under international 
law and can be prosecuted criminally; 
(2) expression that is not criminally 
punishable but may justify a restric-
tion and a civil suit; and (3) expression 
that does not give rise to criminal or 
civil sanctions, but still raises concerns 
in terms of tolerance, civility and re-
spect for others. This remains a use-
ful categorization, and as noted by the 
Special Rapporteur, these categories 
of expression pose different issues 
that call for different legal and policy 
responses.54 
If these categories are not taken into 
consideration, distinctions between il-
legal content, content that is contrary 
to terms of service and objectionable 
content may become blurred. Such 
blurring must be avoided, especial-
ly given that, as affirmed by the UN 
Human Rights Committee, Article 19 
of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) protects 
the expression of opinions and ideas, 
even if some individuals may see them 
as deeply offensive.55  
Drawing upon the aforementioned 
work, it may be possible to point to the 
following six types of expression:
54. Annual report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression to 
the General Assembly. (2012). A/67/357, para. 2.
55. United Nations, Human Rights Committee. (2011, September 12). General Comment No. 34 on Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression. 
CCPR/C/GC/34, para 11.
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1 4
2 5
3 6
Expression that constitutes an offense under 
international law and can be prosecuted criminally
Expression that is not against applicable law, 
but violates relevant terms of service
Expression that constitutes an offense under 
national law and can be prosecuted criminally
Expression that is neither against applicable law, 
nor relevant terms of service, but seen by some 
as offensive
Expression that is not criminally punishable 
but may justify a restriction and a civil suit Expression that is entirely uncontroversial
The six types of expression:
It may be tempting to view this struc-
ture as a form of ranking. Doing so, 
however, involves at least one inappro-
priate simplification: not all laws are 
made equal. It is often argued that laws 
should trump terms of service, because 
whereas laws are the result of an estab-
lished democratic process, the terms 
of service are unilaterally imposed by 
profit-driven corporations. This rea-
soning does not lack merit, but if the 
superior position of laws is founded 
upon their democratic pedigree, what 
about laws that are not based on demo-
cratic processes? What is, for example, 
the proper relationship between terms 
of service and dictatorial laws aimed at 
suppressing democratic movements? 
2 . 4 . 2
Harmonization via company norms
Another notable overarching trend 
is the comparatively high degree of 
transnational harmonization through 
company norms, versus the fractured 
country-based norm setting and de-
cision making. There is a considerable 
degree of harmonization across the 
norms (e.g., terms of use) implemented 
by the major (US-based) internet plat-
forms. This may be explained, in part, 
by the fact that these platforms are 
subject to the same legal requirements 
from various states. But such harmo-
nization clearly goes beyond those le-
gal requirements, which suggests that 
it must be understood as being in the 
platforms’ interest – even though the 
extent to which this harmonization 
may expand beyond dominant internet 
platforms remains to be seen.
The laws of different states, by con-
trast, are yet to reach a comparable 
degree of harmonization. Given how 
far-reaching cultural, economic, soci-
etal, and religious differences impact 
the fundamental laws of each state, 
such harmonization seems unlikely.
Interviewed experts also drew atten-
tion to the cooperative spirit among 
the major internet platforms in pur-
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suit of common goals, such as content 
moderation. As some interviewed ex-
perts noted, there is less of a cooper-
ative spirit among states, aside from 
sectoral cooperation in the context, 
for example, of law enforcement. In 
fact, interviewed experts noted a clear 
trend of individualism among states, 
with each state prioritizing its own 
interest over the interest of the global 
community.
It is also noteworthy that, in relation to 
some types of content, platforms have 
taken the lead in setting standards. 
The move against non-consensual dis-
tribution of sexually explicit media is 
one example of this.
In an environment where standard cre-
ation is not the exclusive domain of na-
tion states, these differences between 
harmonized company norms and frac-
tured country-based norm setting may 
have long-term implications of strong 
relevance for cross-border legal chal-
lenges on the internet.
2 . 4 . 3
Judicial cross-fertilization – scalability, replication and imitation
The physical structure of the internet 
is coordinated to a large extent. Many 
aspects of the logical layer, such as the 
domain name sphere, are coordinat-
ed, as well. Yet both the literature and 
stakeholder input provided for this 
Report suggest that there is a lack of 
international coordination and coop-
eration on regulation of the internet 
more broadly. 
A clear majority (68%) of surveyed ex-
perts ‘strongly disagreed’ or ‘disagreed’ 
that the existing tools of inter-state 
legal cooperation are effectively ad-
dressing online abuses. Only 2% 
‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’, while 30% 
responded that they ‘neither agreed 
nor disagreed’.
Do existing inter-state legal cooperation
tools effectively address online abuse?
I N F O G R A P H I C  1 1
Neither agree
or disagreeDisagree Agree
Strongly
disagree
16,7% 0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
10,5%
33,3%
10,7%
21,1%
20%
11,1%
17,6%
35,7%53,6%
31,6%36,8%
25%55%
53%
50%
55,6%
33,3%
29,4%
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agreeNeither agreeor disagree
17%
SOURCE: Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network: Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019
30% 2%51%
STATES
INTERNET COMPANIES
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
ACADEMIA
TECHNICAL OPERATORS
CIVIL SOCIETY
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The responses highlighted consensus 
across regions and stakeholder groups, 
and several important comments from 
surveyed experts substantiate con-
cerns held throughout the ecosystem. 
For example, one surveyed expert 
noted that tools alone cannot address 
online abuses, and that effective miti-
gation xisting fundamental differences 
in state attitudes toward the roles that 
democracy and religion should play 
in legal matters further complicate 
efforts at coordination. Furthermore, 
several surveyed experts stressed that 
although existing tools of inter-state 
legal cooperation may be sufficient 
for non-urgent matters, slow bureau-
cratic procedures are a bad fit with the 
rapid pace of the internet.
In their comments on the existing 
tools of inter-state legal cooperation, 
surveyed experts also emphasized the 
need for a multistakeholder approach. 
For example, one comment noted that 
it is not only governments that need to 
work together, but business and civil 
society, as well. At the same time, sev-
eral surveyed experts commented that 
although there is still a long way to go, 
improvements are noticeable.  
This lack of coordination is a direct, 
and perhaps natural, consequence of 
the fact that states enjoy sovereign-
ty insofar as they have the capacity 
to make their own laws. Given that 
states take fundamentally different 
approaches to matters such as balanc-
ing human rights, protecting consum-
ers and supporting business, it is not 
surprising to see them face problems 
in coordinating internet regulation. 
Further complicating efforts at coor-
dination are fundamental differences 
in state attitudes toward the roles that 
democracy and religion should play in 
legal matters. The complexity of this 
situation will only increase as more de-
veloping states play bigger roles online.
As previously noted, the international 
climate has also changed more broad-
ly in recent years, as states move away 
from international collaborative efforts 
and common goals, and toward more 
inward-looking policies that prioritize 
the immediate interests of each state. 
To put it simply, international distrust 
seems to be increasing. This broader 
political trend inevitably presents an 
additional hurdle for the effective co-
ordination of internet regulation. 
At the same time, it remains a fact that, 
due to the cross-border nature of the 
internet, the challenges faced online 
can only be addressed through inter-
national collaborative efforts and the 
pursuit of common goals; stakeholders 
simply cannot afford to not collabo-
rate. An individual state neither can, 
nor should, control the internet or 
what is available online. For the mo-
“There are numerous 
indicators that 
the world is not 
ready for a general 
international 
agreement to 
settle all matters of 
internet regulation. 
Such a giant leap 
is unfortunately 
unrealistic.”
ment, international multistakeholder 
dialogue remains the only alternative. 
However, there are numerous indi-
cators that the world is not ready for 
a general international agreement to 
settle all matters of internet regula-
tion. Such a giant leap is unfortunate-
ly unrealistic. Instead, progress will be 
achieved through many small steps, 
at least for now. States could increase 
efforts to identify uniting features and 
to iron out at least the most serious 
inconsistencies and clashes between 
domestic legal systems, in relation to 
both substantive and procedural law. 
In this context, interviewed experts 
noted that although harmonization 
may be impossible on some topics at 
the moment, greater harmonization 
seems both possible and valuable on 
other topics (e.g., data breach notifi-
cation schemes).
Hints of the ‘small step’ progress 
discussed above can be seen in the 
emergence of global jurisprudences 
via judicial cross-fertilization. Sim-
ply put, courts and regulators are in-
creasingly heeding, copying and im-
itating approaches taken by foreign 
courts. Examples of this are promi-
nent in the data privacy field, for ex-
ample, where the EU’s GDPR is being 
widely imitated. 
As discussed in more detail below, 
judicial cross-fertilization is by no 
means occurring in an evenhanded 
manner. In many instances, the in-
fluence is unidirectional rather than 
mutual – typically from industrialized 
states to developing states.
More broadly, this judicial cross-ferti-
lization acts as a ‘double-edged sword’. 
In cases where the approach adopted 
from another court works toward in-
creased international harmonization, 
imitating that approach may obvious-
ly have a positive impact. But in cas-
es where the approach adopted from 
another court is aggressive in nature, 
each adoption of that approach into 
a new legal system moves us further 
from solutions to the cross-border is-
sues faced online. Not all approaches 
are scalable, either. Courts and other 
lawmakers should always bear this 
in mind, both when selecting how 
they approach a specific legal issue, 
and when deciding which, if any, ap-
proaches from foreign courts or law-
makers to adopt.
In addition, courts and other lawmak-
ers ought to bear in mind that the ulti-
mate goal of international law is to help 
to ensure the survival of the human 
species, with obvious sub-goals such 
as ensuring peaceful coexistence, en-
vironmental protection and upholding 
human rights. The internet can play an 
important role in helping to build in-
ternational links and relations through 
cross-border communication and in-
teraction. We must therefore avoid 
using the online environment as a new 
arena for international conflict. These 
goals must be integrated into any as-
sessment of internet jurisdiction.
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Rules are set for – and by – established large actors 
An examination of the survey and in-
terview results points to five factors 
that, together, make a range of actors 
– developing countries, smaller coun-
tries and smaller internet actors – feel 
disempowered:
1.  There is a perception that, com-
pared to developed countries, de-
veloping countries have less of a 
say in the approaches taken by the 
major internet actors;
2.  There is a perception that, com-
pared to major internet actors, 
smaller internet actors have less of 
a say in the approaches taken by the 
regulators;
3.  There is a perception that both 
smaller internet actors and devel-
oping countries lack a voice in the 
international dialogue; 
4.  Extraterritoriality allows dominant 
states to impose their laws on the 
world, while smaller states lack 
the standing and means to enforce 
their laws even domestically; and
5.  Legal approaches from developed 
countries are being replicated to 
such a degree that it impactsthe 
sovereignty of developing countries.
A concern raised by several inter-
viewed and surveyed experts is that 
much of the discussions around how 
to tackle the cross-border internet 
issues faced on the internet centers 
around the largest internet companies 
– particularly US-based companies 
such as Google, Microsoft, Facebook, 
Apple, Amazon, Twitter and eBay. 
There are non-Western examples of 
this dynamic, as well; Chinese stand-
ards, for instance, are introduced as 
a de facto component of subsidized 
mobile and terrestrial broadband in-
frastructure projects in parts of Africa. 
This leads to a skewed perspective of 
the issues faced by the great majority 
of internet actors, which consists of 
smaller businesses and organizations. 
In fact, large actors may also be at a 
disadvantage in dialogues where they 
have a structure or business model 
that deviates from the more standard-
ized structures of the major actors. For 
example, Wikipedia operates across 
borders and is available in different 
versions, like other major internet 
platforms. However, the various Wiki-
pedia versions are language-based 
and independent from one another – 
which is distinctly different from the 
more standard approach of publishing 
different country versions of a plat-
form. The implications of this struc-
tural difference are profound. In the 
context of content removal orders, 
for example, a court order to remove 
certain content will inevitably affect all 
users of the Wikipedia language ver-
sion in question, and removal on one 
language version has no impact on 
what is available on another language 
version. Courts and regulators need to 
be alert to the legal implications of this 
type of structural differences.
There are obvious practical reasons 
for directing most attention at the 
major internet platforms. Where gov-
ernments wish to maximize impact, 
they naturally target companies with 
the greatest number of users. And the 
major internet companies have the 
resources to participate in discus-
sions on matters of internet regula-
tion. Yet despite such practical jus-
tifications, the under-representation 
of smaller internet players remains an 
overarching meta-trend that ought to 
be addressed.    
Highlighting a related meta-trend, 
many interviewed and surveyed ex-
perts from developing countries (and, 
to a degree, from smaller countries) 
perceived that they become aware of, 
and participate in, important policy 
and regulatory discussions only when 
many decisions have already been 
made. This is partially an issue of ac-
cess to information, and is discussed in 
more detail elsewhere in this Report. 
“The under-representation 
of smaller internet actors 
and developing countries
 in crafting solutions 
requires both rethinking 
and restructuring.”
There is a continuing need to work on 
solutions for soliciting and incorporat-
ing early input from all stakeholders. 
The under-representation of smaller 
internet actors and developing coun-
tries in crafting solutions requires 
both re-thinking and restructuring. In-
creased capacity building is one of the 
more obvious responses. There is also 
a power imbalance in the context of 
the extraterritorial application of laws. 
Some states have greater power to have 
their laws enforced in an extraterrito-
rial manner, even in cases where the 
laws in question are identical, or near 
identical. This power imbalance – often 
between industrialized and developing 
countries – may become increasingly 
visible as more states adopt ‘rep locali-
zation’ requirements.   
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New roles for intermediaries
2 . 5
Without internet intermediaries such as search engines, auctioning platforms, 
video platforms and social media platforms, the internet would be considerably 
less useful, and considerably less user-friendly. Indeed, internet intermediaries 
play a central role in the operation of the online environment; they have in the 
past, they do so now, and they will continue to do so in the future. Yet their exact 
roles and responsibilities are contested and controversial topics, and the subject 
of significant work. The Stanford World Intermediary Liability Map, for example, is 
an online resource that provides internet platforms and others with information 
on online liability laws.56
2 . 5 . 1
Increasing responsibility bestowed on private operators 
The increasing responsibility be-
stowed on private operators – through 
both laws that make internet plat-
forms the gatekeepers of content 
and the voluntary assumption of re-
sponsibility – has occurred in numer-
ous fields. This trend is particularly 
discernable in certain fields, and has 
evolved particularly far in the con-
text of terrorism, extremism and hate 
speech – fields in which some laws de-
mand fast response times in content 
blocking. For example, on December 
19, 2018, Facebook announced that it 
had banned 425 pages, 17 groups, 135 
Facebook accounts and 15 Instagram 
accounts for engaging in coordinat-
ed inauthentic behavior linked to the 
situation in Myanmar.57 The banned 
accounts were sharing anti-Rohingya 
messages — the same kind of messages 
that have fueled a broader genocide in 
Myanmar.58 
As far as extremism and hate speech 
are concerned, the most widely noted 
framework for increasing responsibil-
ity bestowed on private operators is 
the 2016 Code of conduct on counter-
ing illegal hate speech online present-
ed by the EU Commission, together 
with Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and 
YouTube. Under this arrangement, the 
mentioned IT companies undertake to:
•  Have in place clear and effective 
processes to review notifications 
regarding illegal hate speech on 
their services so they can remove 
or disable access to such content. 
•  Have in place Rules or Community 
Guidelines clarifying that they pro-
hibit the promotion of incitement 
to violence and hateful conduct. 
•  Upon receipt of a valid removal 
notification, review such requests 
against their rules and communi-
ty guidelines and, where neces-
sary, national laws transposing the 
Framework Decision 2008/913/
JHA, with dedicated teams review-
ing requests. 
•  Review the majority of valid noti-
fications for removal of illegal hate 
speech in less than 24 hours and 
remove or disable access to such 
content, if necessary. 
The cross-border implications are 
obvious.
56. Stanford Center for Internet and Society. (2018). World Intermediary Liability Map. Retrieved from https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu/. 
57. Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network. (2018, December). Facebook announces ban of over 400 pages and 100 accounts relating to Myanmar 
conflict. I&J Retrospect Database. Retrieved from https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect#article-7741_2018-12. 
58. Wagner. K. (2018, December 18). Facebook removed hundreds more accounts linked to the Myanmar military for posting hate speech and 
attacks against ethnic minorities. Recode. Retrieved from https://www.recode.net/2018/12/18/18146967/facebook-myanmar-military-accounts-
removed-rohingya-genocide. 
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2 . 5 . 2
(In)voluntary gatekeepers 
The role of – and possible protection 
for – internet intermediaries is often 
approached from extremist points of 
view. Some seek to impose an uncom-
promising free speech regime, under 
which internet intermediaries impose 
no restrictions on what internet users 
upload. Others see internet intermedi-
aries as little more than useful tools for 
government control of internet con-
tent and activities. Such extreme views 
are ultimately unhelpful, and we need 
to strive for an appropriate balance.
Historically, Western countries have 
viewed internet intermediaries as cru-
cial for the development of the inter-
net, and have therefore afforded them 
extensive protection – for example, in 
the form of the well-known §230 of 
the US Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 and through Articles 12-15 of 
the EU’s E-Commerce Directive.59  Both 
these instruments provide internet in-
termediaries with protection against 
liability in certain circumstances. But 
this attitude seems to be changing.
In focusing on cross-border legal 
challenges on the internet, four key 
issues must be addressed as a matter 
of urgency:
1.  The need to minimize, or preferably 
eliminate, situations where internet 
intermediaries risk violating one 
state’s law by complying with an-
other state’s law;
2.  The need to clarify the extent to 
which internet intermediaries – 
as private actors – may assume 
the role of fulfilling quasi-judicial 
functions (either voluntarily or in-
voluntarily);
3.  The need to ensure that the law 
provides the clearest possible guid-
ance as to what is expected of the 
internet intermediaries; and
4.  The need for clear distinctions be-
tween situations where internet 
intermediaries are viewed as pub-
lishers and where they are seen as 
neutral platforms.
Situations where a party risks violat-
ing one state’s law by complying with 
another state’s law are referred to as 
‘true’ conflicts of laws. There is wide-
spread recognition that they benefit 
no one and should be avoided. The 
problem is finding a way to do so in a 
climate where states are rarely willing 
to compromise on the applicability of 
their laws.  
Yet a potential model can be found in 
Australia’s Privacy Act. Section 6A lim-
its the extraterritorial effect of the Act 
by providing that: “[a]n act or practice 
does not breach an Australian Privacy 
Principle if: (a) the act is done, or the 
practice is engaged in, outside Austral-
ia and the external Territories; and (b) 
the act or practice is required by an ap-
plicable law of a foreign country.”60
The duties-focused definition of con-
flicts of laws only describes part of 
the problem. There are also so-called 
‘false’ conflicts of laws. These occur 
when a person subject to two or more 
laws can comply with all the applicable 
laws, which can be the case if one law 
is more flexible than the other, or if one 
law gives a right and the other imposes 
an opposing duty. 
In the context of internet intermedi-
aries, the importance of such ‘false’ 
conflicts of laws may be underappre-
ciated. The correlative relationship 
between rights and duties, familiar to 
us from domestic law, does not exist in 
the cross-border environment; rights 
provided under one state’s legal sys-
tem may not necessarily create corre-
sponding duties under other legal sys-
tems. To assess whether two (or more) 
laws are in conflict, we need to account 
for both the duties and the rights for 
which those laws provide. In other 
words, even where duties do not clash, 
but the rights of one country clash with 
the duties of another state, we need to 
carefully evaluate to which law prior-
ity is given. In an international con-
text, there are no legal reasons for an 
internet intermediary to automatically 
prioritize duties imposed by one state 
over the rights afforded by other states. 
On a practical level, however, internet 
intermediaries may seek to avoid pen-
alties by abiding by the duties imposed 
by one state rather than pursuing the 
rights afforded under the law of other 
states, unless they receive safeguards. 
This leads to a risk of over-blocking 
and a race to the bottom.61  
Internet intermediaries fulfill quasi-ju-
dicial functions in a variety of contexts. 
Sometimes this happens voluntarily, 
“Internet intermediaries 
fulfill quasi-judicial 
functions in a variety 
of contexts.”
59.  Directive (EC) 2000/ 31 of the European Parliament and Council, 8 June 2000, on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in 
particular Electronic Commerce [2000] OJ L178/ 1, 369.
60. Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6A(4).
61. PwC. (2018). Top policy trends of 2018. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-regulatory-consulting/assets/top-policy-trends-2018.pdf.
and sometimes this role is forced upon 
them. Examples of the former include 
actions such as the removal of child 
abuse materials. For example, on Octo-
ber 24, 2018, Facebook announced that 
it had removed 8.7 million child abuse 
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images in the previous three months, 
using previously undisclosed software 
that helps flag potential child abuse ma-
terial for its reviewers.62  
An observation made by one inter-
viewed expert is particularly pertinent 
in this context. Perhaps due to the 
company structure commonly adopt-
ed by major US internet platforms, and 
perhaps out of convenience, decisions 
relating to content blocking and take-
downs are often implemented on a 
regional, rather than national, basis in 
some parts of the world. For example, if 
one country in the Middle East orders 
content to be blocked or taken down 
due to blasphemy laws, that content is 
frequently blocked or removed for the 
entire region – even though the content 
in question may well be lawful in some 
countries in the region.   
There are many examples of internet 
intermediaries being forced to assume 
a quasi-judicial function. For example, 
on December 6, 2018, Ugandan inter-
net service providers (ISPs) started im-
plementing a directive of the Uganda 
Communications Commission (UCC) 
to block access to websites with adult 
content;63  examples from China, Indo-
nesia, Korea, Russia, Turkey as well as 
Australia and the EU are mentioned lat-
er in the Report.
In these situations, internet interme-
diaries become the censors and gate-
keepers of speech – a role for which 
they are typically ill suited. It is ques-
tionable whether society should assign 
such a crucial role to private entities. 
Some may point to the fact that news-
papers, radio and TV broadcasters have 
long acted as censors in deciding what 
content to make available. But the role 
of the internet intermediary is so fun-
damentally different that one cannot, 
and should not, draw such a compar-
ison. A common argument holds that 
internet intermediaries are more like 
the postal service, passively distrib-
uting other people’s content without 
interference. Yet such analogies may 
only serve as a distraction, rather than 
providing a useful tool for discussion. 
The reality is that no intermediaries in 
history have had to manage the volume 
of user-generated content that internet 
intermediaries do today. 
The role of internet intermediaries must 
therefore be approached with fresh 
eyes, free from preconceived notions 
based on comparisons with the roles of 
offline intermediaries. 
Expectations of internet intermediaries 
only serve to complicate the situation. 
While most people would expect in-
ternet intermediaries to abide by the 
law of their respective countries, they 
would probably not want them to abide 
by all laws of all other countries in the 
world. In the end, such compliance 
would force internet intermediaries 
to account for only the most restric-
tive laws from all the countries in the 
world. Such a ‘race to the bottom’ is 
certainly an unhealthy direction for the 
internet. And if this is undesired, there 
is a need to consider whether a globally 
active internet intermediary can ever 
be excused for not complying with all 
the laws around the world that claim 
to apply to its conduct. If stakeholders 
answer that question in the affirmative, 
how should a globally active internet 
intermediary decide which laws to 
abide by? These are, to a degree, novel 
questions in international law.
Without clear guidance from the law, 
internet intermediaries may be tasked 
with deciding the legality of certain 
content.64  In such a situation, one could 
argue that internet intermediaries are 
set up to fail due to the vagueness of the 
62. Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network. (2018, October). Facebook announces it has removed 8.7 million child abuse images in past three 
months thanks to previously undisclosed software. I&J Retrospect Database. Retrieved from  https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/
retrospect#article-7567_2018-10.
63. Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network. (2018, December). Uganda: ISPs start implementing regulator’s order to remove access to websites with 
adult content. I&J Retrospect Database. Retrieved from https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect#article-7736_2018-12. 
64. Sartor, G. (2013). Provider’s liability and the right to be forgotten. In D. Svantesson & S. Greenstein (Eds.) Nordic yearbook of law and informatics 
2010– 2012: Internationalisation of law in the digital information society. Copenhagen: Ex Tuto Publishing. 101– 37, 111.
65. Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, para 156.
66.United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom and Expression. (2018) 2018 Thematic Report to the 
Human Rights Council. A/HRC/38/35. Retrieved from http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/38/35, p. 8.
laws they must apply. It may also be not-
ed, in this context, that internet inter-
mediaries are tasked with fulfilling such 
quasi-judicial functions at a fast pace, 
while the judiciary may take months or 
even years to reach a decision on the 
same matter.  
Because it may be difficult to identify 
and bring to justice the party responsi-
ble for specific online activities, litigants 
and regulators may be tempted to target 
the internet intermediary used for those 
activities, instead. Justice Fenlon made 
this point very clearly in the aforemen-
tioned Canadian Equustek case, stating: 
“Google is an innocent bystander but it 
is unwittingly facilitating the defend-
ants’ ongoing breaches of this Court’s 
orders. There is no other practical way 
for the defendants’ website sales to be 
stopped.”65 Justice Fenlon’s message is 
clear: where the legal system fails, in-
ternet intermediaries can expect to be-
come the scapegoats of choice.  
There is also a long-standing issue 
of distinguishing between internet 
intermediaries as publishers and 
internet intermediaries as neutral 
platforms. Obviously, protections for 
neutral platforms may not extend to 
situations where internet intermedi-
aries act as publishers. This crucial 
neutrality is undermined when plat-
forms are required to promote spe-
cific narratives, as was the case in the 
2016 European Union Code of Conduct 
on countering illegal hate speech on-
line. In this context, it has been noted 
that: “While the promotion of coun-
ter-narratives may be attractive in 
the face of ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ 
content, pressure for such approach-
es runs the risk of transforming plat-
forms into carriers of propaganda 
well beyond established areas of le-
gitimate concern.”66 
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One interviewed expert considered 
that through mergers, acquisitions 
and growth, many intermediaries are 
changing functions to the extent that 
within the same company, there may 
be an advertiser, brand holder, regis-
trar and publisher, and that this cre-
ates an interesting tension. Another 
interviewed expert commented that 
intermediaries, particularly in geo-
graphically bounded spaces, are faced 
with many different jurisdictions and 
associated rules that pose a significant 
challenge – not only for their compli-
ance with those rules, but for commu-
nicating how they apply those rules.
Yet another interviewed expert saw 
this aspect as leading to the vesting 
of significant power in those compa-
nies to implement solutions. That is, if 
these companies implement localized 
solutions on certain issues, it may lead 
to a more fragmented internet with 
different rules that apply in different 
places. This expert was concerned 
about the lack of ability for small-
er players, including businesses and 
small countries, to influence the larger 
intermediaries in the implementation 
of policies. Indeed, as one interviewed 
expert stressed, this issue also extends 
to mid-level powers who enact pol-
icies that large platforms largely ig-
nore, unless they fit with the current 
approaches of the biggest countries.
When a court or an authority decides a 
matter, it is typically possible to appeal 
their decision, and to gain an insight 
into the reasoning that led to their 
decision. Such a transparent appeals 
mechanism is currently lacking in situ-
ations where a private actor acts as the 
decision maker. This is a serious con-
sideration in a context where private 
operators have increased responsibil-
ity to act as filters of extremism and 
hate speech. 
As one interviewed expert noted, the 
lack of grievance resolution mecha-
nisms and the need for transparency 
among platforms are being discussed 
as part of the UN Internet Governance 
Forum’s Dynamic Coalition on Plat-
form Responsibility.67  This expert not-
ed that the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Ex-
pression (Special Rapporteur on FOE) 
also recommended, in a 2018 Thematic 
Report to the United Nations Human 
Rights Council, that companies im-
prove their transparency and account-
ability in content regulation.68 
It should be noted that many of the 
larger internet companies issue trans-
parency reports. But as observed by 
one interviewed expert, while those 
reports include aggregate numbers of 
content takedowns, they do not cur-
rently provide nuanced details about 
how decisions are being made.69 On 
the topic of transparency, one inter-
viewed expert said that companies 
have not successfully found a way to 
communicate the details of their in-
ternal procedures and how they apply 
different rules. This failure has pro-
voked a normative backlash by gov-
ernments, particularly in the context 
of hate speech and fake news.
The issue of accountability is receiv-
ing more attention, as well. The In-
stitute for Accountability in the Digital 
Age (I4ADA), for example, was founded 
with the mission to ensure that online 
reaches of norms and values do not 
undermine the internet’s potential to 
increase access to knowledge, spread 
global tolerance and understanding, 
and promote sustainable prosperity.70 
To that end, I4ADA is working on a set 
of principles – the Hague Global Prin-
ciples for Accountability in the Digital 
Age71 – with significant implications for 
the cross-border legal challenges on 
the internet.
2 . 5 . 2
Appeals and recourse become key issues 
67.  Internet Governance Forum. Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility. Retrieved from https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/
dynamic-coalition-on-platform-responsibility-dcpr.  See also initiatives such as: Internet Policy Observatory. The Santa Clara Principles on 
Transparency and Content Moderation. Retrieved from http://globalnetpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Santa-Clara-Principles_final.pdf 
and Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability. Retrieved from https://www.manilaprinciples.org/.
68.  United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom and Expression. (2018). 2018 Thematic Report to 
the Human Rights Council. A/HRC/38/35. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/ContentRegulation.aspx.
69.  See further the work of: Ranking Digital Rights. Retrieved from https://rankingdigitalrights.org/. 
70.  Institute for Accountability in the Digital Age. Retrieved from https://i4ada.org/. 
71.  Institute for Accountability in the Digital Age. (2018). The Hague Global Principles for Accountability in the Digital Age. Retrieved from https://
i4ada.org/#principles.
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TOPICAL TRENDS
PREVIEW
On the occasion of the 14th United Nations Internet Governance Forum, 
full versions of Chapters 3 (Topical Trends), 4 (Legal and technical 
approaches) and 5 (Relevant concept clusters) will be launched that will 
supplement these initial Key Findings. Stakeholders from around the 
world will be invited between June-October 2019 to contribute online 
to the global data collection and mapping effort, adding to the input 
from more than 100 key stakeholders from five continents who  
contributed to the present Key Findings of the first edition of the  
Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019. 
The following sections provide a preview of the upcoming chapters  
and their preliminary table of contents. 
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It may also prevent internet users from 
accessing as broad a range of content 
as they otherwise could, and raises civ-
il society concerns that abuses are not 
properly addressed, or that attempted 
solutions will harm users. Addressing 
these concerns is a matter of urgency. 
To understand the details and full com-
plexity of the cross-border legal chal-
lenges on the internet, it is useful to 
map out the major trends within the 
topics that are most relevant to the In-
ternet & Jurisdiction Policy Network’s 
stakeholder groups.
To this end, this Chapter will highlight 
a selection of particularly significant 
‘trends’ within topics ranging from data 
privacy to taxation, and from the In-
ternet of Things to cybercrime. These 
diverse topics have been grouped into 
three broader categories: 
1. Expression 
2. Security
3. Economy 
While this approach should aid the 
clarity of the presentation, some top-
ics may fit into more than one cate-
gory. There are also obvious points of 
connection and indeed overlap across 
these categories. For example, eco-
nomic interdependence among states 
remains a check on aggressive behav-
ior72, which highlights the link between 
security and economy. 
Within each of the topics, more detailed 
attention is given to particularly impor-
tant trends as identified through the 
survey results, interviews and extensive 
desk research, including an analysis of 
the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Net-
work’s wide-ranging collection of rele-
vant trends and developments available 
in the I&J Retrospect Database.73  
These sources have also made it pos-
sible to briefly outline other signif-
icant trends within each topic area. 
The goal is to be comprehensive 
without necessarily being exhaustive. 
While it is therefore obvious that ad-
ditional trends could have been incor-
porated,74 the working goal has been 
to ensure a high probability that the 
Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Net-
work’s stakeholders agree that all in-
cluded trends are of significance.
Concerns regarding jurisdictional tensions in cyberspace 
are widespread, as the cross-border nature of the internet 
conflicts with the patchwork of territorially bound national 
laws. The high degree of legal uncertainty increases the 
cost of doing business, and challenges governments to 
protect their citizens and ensure respect of their laws. 
72.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2017). Global trends: Paradox of progress. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/index.php/global-
trends/near-future. 
73.  Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network. I&J Retrospect Database. Retrieved from https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect. 
74.  There are major trends, left out in this section, that are likely to become major jurisdictional issues within a foreseeable future. As pointed 
out by one interviewed expert, one such matter is found in that there is an increasing concern about digital labor issues. For example, persons 
employed to assess take-down request are becoming an integral part of the internet infrastructure doing menial tasks that greatly impact 
freedom of expression. Cross-border issues arise where such tasks are allocated to foreign workers, and questions have arisen as to the degree 
of support afforded to such workers who often are exposed to highly disturbing and offensive content. Issues such as this are important but have 
not been included in this year’s Report.
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75.  U.S. Const. amend. I. Retrieved from https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-i. 
76.  See e.g.: United Nations, General Assembly. Human Rights Council: Draft Resolution: The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human 
rights on the internet, A/HRC/32/L.20 (June 27, 2016). Retrieved from https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G16/131/89/PDF/G1613189.
pdf?OpenElement.
Expression
3 . 1
The first category of major topical 
trends concerns expression. Recent 
discussions around the intersection of 
internet and jurisdiction and expres-
sion have focused on concerns about 
hate speech, extremism and fake news, 
as well as the widespread reform of 
data privacy regimes around the world. 
Increasingly broad claims pervade 
these discussions, and there is a grow-
ing appetite to re-examine the role of 
internet intermediaries. 
Encouraging and facilitating cross-bor-
der expression has been a driving force 
behind much of the internet’s develop-
ment, both in physical (e.g., hardware) 
and non-physical (e.g., content plat-
forms) dimensions. As many critical 
early developments originated in the 
US, the American perspective on free-
dom of speech – articulated in the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution 
– has colored much of the early dis-
course and guiding principles.75 While 
weaker today due to the strong prolif-
eration of internet usage outside the 
US – where more than 80% of Face-
book’s users now reside – the encour-
agement and facilitation of freedom 
of expression, including cross-border 
expression, remains a valued corner-
stone of the internet in large parts of 
the world. In recognition of this, the 
UN has stressed that the right to free-
dom of expression on the internet is an 
issue of increasing importance.76 
When asked what, if any, negative con-
sequences they foresee if cross-border 
legal challenges on the internet are not 
properly addressed, 59% of surveyed 
experts raised the issue of potential 
restrictions on expression. This was 
one of the strongest concerns among 
the stakeholders.
 3.1.1 Extremism, terrorism and hate speech
 3.1.2 Defamation
 3.1.2.1 Geographical scope of the right to reputation
 3.1.3 Online bullying
 3.1.4 Non-consensual distribution of sexually explicit media
 3.1.5 Fake News and misinformation
 3.1.5.1 Attacks on democracy
 3.1.5.2 Expression and platform moderation: responsibility, liability and question of neutrality
 3.1.6 Data privacy
 3.1.6.1 General Data Protection Regulation
 3.1.6.2 The right to de-referencing
 3.1.6.3 Data privacy restriction of cross-border data transfers
Preliminary Table of Contents for Chapter 3.1
64
I N T E R N E T  &  J U R I S D I C T I O N  P O L I C Y  N E T W O R K
Security
3 . 2
The internet gives rise to numerous 
security issues, ranging from person-
al security to national security. As the 
internet continues to play an increas-
ingly central role in society, internet 
security will only become more im-
portant. And in a world where more 
and more things are ‘connected’, it is 
becoming harder to separate online 
security from offline security. 
The significance of this development 
is clearly reflected in the World Eco-
nomic Forum’s Global Risks Report 
201877.  Among the Top 10 risks in terms 
of likelihood, ‘cyberattacks’ ranked 3rd 
and ‘data fraud or theft’ ranked 4th. 
This is particularly serious given that 
‘cyberattacks’ is also ranked 6th among 
the top 10 risks in terms of impact. 
This interconnectedness is palpable, 
as actions in one state impact other 
states, giving rise to many cross-bor-
der legal challenges in the context of 
security. These include:
•  Countries may struggle to collab-
orate on, and coordinate, security 
efforts; 
•  Criminals may benefit significantly 
from jurisdictional obstacles to the 
detection, investigation and prose-
cution of their misdeeds;
•  Ensuring access to digital evidence 
often depends on the cooperation of 
private actors, which has sparked a 
re-examination of the role they hold;
•  States seeking to place their citi-
zens under surveillance may need 
the voluntary or coerced coopera-
tion of foreign privately-operated 
platforms, and breaking encryption 
may depend on the cooperation of 
foreign hardware manufacturers;
•  Data breaches by a company in 
one state may impact a worldwide 
group of users; and
•  States may adopt e-government 
solutions that involve storing critical 
data on servers in foreign countries.
It is also increasingly difficult to dis-
tinguish between the regulation of 
security and other fields of regulation. 
Security requirements, for example, 
are a standard aspect of many data 
privacy regimes. In that regard, data 
privacy and security are two sides of 
the same proverbial coin, even though 
the two are often portrayed in opposi-
tion to one another. 
In the online security field, it is some-
times difficult to distinguish between 
civil wrongs, criminal offenses, acts of 
terrorism and even military aggres-
sion. This contributes to making reg-
ulation – and especially international 
consensus on regulatory responses – 
difficult to achieve.
But some distinctions are developing. 
In the context of access to digital ev-
idence, for example, one interviewed 
expert noted that governments are 
increasingly emphasizing the need for 
different processes for national secu-
rity matters compared to traditional 
criminal matters.
It is clear that the area of security is 
complex and multifaceted.
77.  World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2018, 13th Edition. Retrieved from http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2018/.
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78.  Lee-Makiyama. (2017, July 10). The digital trade oversight. International Trade Forum. Retrieved from http://www.tradeforum.org/article/The-
digital-trade-oversight/. 
79. Cann, O. (2016, January 22). $100 trillion by 2025: The digital dividend for society and business. World Economic Forum. Retrieved from https://
www.weforum.org/press/2016/01/100-trillion-by-2025-the-digital-dividend-for-society-and-business/. 
80. Baur, C. & Wee, D. (2015 June). Manufacturing’s next act. McKinsey & Company. Retrieved from  https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
operations/our-insights/manufacturings-next-act.
Economy
3 . 3
In the economic context, much in-
ternational attention has lately been 
directed at the cross-border applica-
tion of territorially based intellectual 
property rights, taxation, and emerg-
ing technologies such as the Internet 
of Things and blockchain. As in the 
context of expression and security 
discussed above, the role of internet 
intermediaries is broadly being re-ex-
amined. In fact, with regard to the 
economy, there seems to be a more 
profound change in attitudes toward 
internet platforms.   
Although it was not always the case, 
economical activities are now a natural 
and important part of the online envi-
ronment. For example, it has been es-
timated that at least half of all trade in 
services is supplied via the internet;78 
and the World Economic Forum has 
estimated that the overall economic 
value of digital transformation to busi-
ness and society will exceed 100 tril-
lion US dollars by 2025.79 Indeed, even 
when offered free of monetary charg-
es, most online uses and activities are 
commercial to a significant extent.
The significance of the internet’s eco-
nomic dimension will continue to in-
crease over the coming years, due to 
what has been termed Industry 4.0. 
That is: 
“the next phase in the digitization 
of the manufacturing sector, driven 
by four disruptions: the astonishing 
rise in data volumes, computation-
al power, and connectivity, especially 
new low-power wide-area networks; 
the emergence of analytics and busi-
ness-intelligence capabilities; new 
forms of human-machine interaction 
Several surveyed and interviewed ex-
perts emphasized that complying with 
often complex laws from multiple 
sources calls for a degree of legal so-
phistication that is often beyond the 
reach of SMEs. Experts cited the com-
“The ability to reach 
customers all over the 
globe at a faster pace 
and lower cost than 
ever before remains 
dependent upon a 
favorable regulatory 
environment.”
03. Topical trends (Preview)
such as touch interfaces and augment-
ed-reality systems; and improvements 
in transferring digital instructions to 
the physical world, such as advanced 
robotics and 3-D printing.”80 
The digitalization of the economy – via 
access to an open internet and constant 
technological developments – is a driv-
ing force for growth. It enables compa-
nies, and particularly small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), to compete on the 
world stage and create new opportuni-
ties in developing, ordering, producing, 
marketing or delivering their products 
and services. However, the ability to 
reach customers all over the globe at 
a faster pace and lower cost than ever 
before remains dependent upon a fa-
vorable regulatory environment. 
plexity of privacy and consumer pro-
tection regulation and tax implications 
as specific examples.  It was also noted 
that start-ups are exposed to the reg-
ulatory burden at a stage where they 
least can afford it. To build a user base, 
new businesses must often begin by 
giving away their services, before build-
ing a proven user base to secure reve-
nue through advertisements. Yet the 
cost of ensuring regulatory compliance 
is incurred from the start – indeed, 
even prior to the launch of the service.  
Experts also noted that SMEs are too 
often not part of regulatory discus-
sions, which largely focus on the in-
ternet giants. At the same time, some 
experts pointed out that, compared 
to the large internet actors, SMEs are 
better placed to ignore claims of juris-
diction from distant states, as they can 
more easily avoid placing persons and 
assets within the reach of those states’ 
enforcement powers. 
69% of surveyed experts ‘agreed’, or 
‘strongly agreed’, that the complexity 
of cross-border legal challenges on 
the internet is a significant barrier for 
SMEs entering the global digital econ-
omy. 21% ‘neither agreed nor disa-
greed’, and only 10% either ‘disagreed’, 
or ‘strongly disagreed’. 
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Are cross-border legal challenges on 
the internet a significant barrier for Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)?
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These figures were largely consistent 
across the different regions and stake-
holder groups. Some, however, assert-
ed that the complexity of cross-border 
legal challenges on the internet is not 
so much a barrier for SMEs entering 
the global digital economy, as it is a 
barrier for SMEs seeking growth in the 
global digital economy. Cross-border 
trade on the internet also has the po-
tential to be an equalizer between the 
developed and developing world, as it 
allows developing countries to bypass 
some of the steps today’s developed 
countries had to go through. Yet while 
the potential advantages are great, so 
are some of the obstacles.
In the survey study, 54% of surveyed 
experts ‘agreed’, or ‘strongly agreed’, 
that the complexity of cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet 
is a significant barrier for developing 
countries entering the global digital 
economy. 37,5% ‘neither agreed nor 
disagreed’, and only 18,5% either ‘disa-
greed’, or ‘strongly disagreed’, that the 
complexity of cross-border legal chal-
lenges on the internet is a significant 
barrier for developing countries enter-
ing the global digital economy. 
“Cross-border trade 
on the internet also 
has the potential to be 
an equalizer between 
the developed and 
developing world.”
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Are cross-border legal challenges 
on the internet a significant barrier 
for developing countries?
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03. Topical trends (Preview)
One surveyed expert noted that even 
the fear of the legal difficulties asso-
ciated with cross-border internet ac-
tivity dissuades people in developing 
countries from engaging in such activ-
ities. Further, one interviewed expert 
noted that the main difficulty facing 
developing countries is the significant-
ly faster pace at which the internet 
evolves today, compared to the past. 
The pace of change in the regulatory 
environment and its complexification – 
due, in large part, to an increased reg-
ulatory appetite and extraterritoriality 
– is increasing, as well. Yet the survey 
also revealed a marked difference in at-
titudes among surveyed experts from 
different regions and their comments 
provide an explanation for these strong 
regional differences. Both surveyed 
and interviewed experts emphasized 
that poverty, skill levels, illiteracy, lan-
guage barriers, political instability, lack 
of investors and poor ICT infrastruc-
ture are bigger concerns in regions 
such as Africa and some parts of Latin 
America, than are the legal cross-bor-
der challenges. 
Experts also raised the point that de-
veloping countries are often not part of, 
and indeed not even aware of, agree-
ments and other regulatory develop-
ments discussed or concluded among 
developed countries. Experts observed 
that developing countries experience 
difficulties when developed countries 
seek to apply their laws in an extrater-
ritorial manner that affects developing 
countries, including businesses and 
persons in developing countries. There 
is also a perception that, compared to 
developed countries, developing coun-
tries have less of a say in the approach-
es taken by major internet actors. This 
sense of disempowerment is a clear 
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trend, and arguably pressures devel-
oping countries to choose between ex-
isting, partially competing approaches 
(e.g., between a ‘Western approach’ 
promoting democratic values and a 
Chinese ‘digital sovereignty’ approach) 
rather than having the opportunity to 
develop their own approaches.
Surveyed and interviewed experts also 
observed that much of the online ac-
tivity in developing countries is local 
in nature, and therefore confronts the 
complexity of cross-border legal chal-
lenges on the internet less often. 
Taken together, this suggests that al-
though the complexity of cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet 
is an important barrier for developing 
countries entering the global digital 
economy, it is just one of several – and 
perhaps not the most acute.
 3.3.1 Intellectual property
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Some jurisdictions have advanced 
with remarkable speed, setting global 
norms that compete, at least in part, 
with global norm-setting initiatives of 
other jurisdictions. Indeed, it may not 
be an exaggeration to speak of an on-
going race toward global norm setting 
between the EU, the US, China and, to a 
lesser extent, Russia. 
States seek competitive advantages 
in this race in a variety of ways, rang-
ing from political initiatives, such as 
building capacity, and creating financial 
and security dependence among oth-
er countries, to the use of legal tools 
such as extraterritoriality and treaties. 
In this landscape, there is now a clear 
After a long period of relative inaction, there are now 
myriad legal approaches to addressing the cross-border 
legal challenges on the internet. Particularly over the past 
five years, both developing and industrialized countries 
have stopped procrastinating and taken a multiplicity 
of uncoordinated actions. 
“Over the past five 
years, both developing 
and industrialized 
countries have stopped 
procrastinating and 
taken a multiplicity of 
uncoordinated actions.”
distinction between jurisdictions that 
set norms, and those that largely adopt 
the norms set by others. Unsurprising-
ly, smaller and developing countries are 
almost exclusively on the receiving end.
Although laws offer some solutions, 
there is recognition that public-private 
standards or industry self-regulation 
may offer solutions, as well.
Several technical solutions have been 
advanced, each with a substantial im-
pact on the cross-border legal chal-
lenges on the internet. The aforemen-
tioned race toward global norm setting 
is playing out in this context, as well, 
with measures such as internet shut-
downs, blocking and the forceful ac-
quisition of innovation enablers making 
headlines in the news. 
This Chapter outlines and analyzes a 
selection of major legal and technical 
approaches to solutions that experts 
emphasized in surveys and interviews, 
or that have gained particularly strong 
attention in the literature. 
As one interviewed expert noted, the 
fact that the issues with which stake-
holders now struggle are not new can 
either be viewed as a source of reassur-
ance, or a cause for concern. 
Major legal approaches 
to solutions
4 . 1
States take a wide range of legal ap-
proaches in the pursuit of what 
they perceive to be solutions to the 
cross-border legal challenges on the 
Internet. There is clearly an increased 
appetite for so-called ‘takedown’ and 
‘stay-down’ orders from courts. There 
are also signs of a race to the highest 
potential fines – states are increasing 
the penalties they impose in order to 
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4.1.1 Takedown, stay-down and stay-up orders by courts
4.1.2 Race to the highest potential fines
4.1.3 ‘Rep localization’ – forced local representation
4.1.4  Jurisdictional trawling as a regulatory approach
4.1.5  Targeting/directing activities/doing business/‘effects doctrine’
4.1.6  A common focus, but lacking agreement on, comity
4.1.7  Scope of jurisdiction – local court orders with global implications
4.1.8 Terms of service and community guidelines
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prioritize adherence to their particu-
lar laws (over the adherence to com-
peting legal frameworks imposed by 
other states). 
Another emerging tool used to ensure 
enforceability of state law is so-called 
‘rep localization’ – that is, laws requir-
ing businesses to nominate a local rep-
resentative within the state imposing 
the requirement. In addition, states 
are increasingly engaging in what may 
be described as jurisdictional trawling, 
whereby they make excessively broad 
claims of jurisdiction, giving them con-
siderable discretion in deciding whom 
to direct their enforcement efforts 
against. There is also a persistent, and 
perhaps growing, reliance on jurisdic-
tional tests focused on ‘targeting’. 
At the same time, however, there are 
some signs of restraint. While it re-
mains a contested concept on the in-
ternational level, comity and other calls 
for interest balancing are discernable 
on several levels. Furthermore, the 
matter of how states approach the 
scope of jurisdiction still hangs in the 
balance. Will the emerging practice of 
states seeking to give their judgments 
global effect become cemented? Or will 
a more nuanced approach prevail? This 
will be a key battleground in the coming 
years.
Finally, the extent to which terms of 
service and community guidelines, 
rather than law, shape online behavior 
remains a live issue.
As discussed in the Introduction, at-
tempts at finding legal approaches to 
solving the cross-border legal issues 
facing the internet are hampered by 
‘artificial regulatory challenges’ – that 
is, contemporary frameworks and con-
cepts are insufficient to successfully 
address these issues. 
Overcoming such artificial regulatory 
challenges may require changes to tra-
ditional frameworks and concepts. But 
it also requires capacity building, which 
dovetails with the need for inclusive-
ness – a key issue to be considered in 
the context of approaches to solutions, 
and a recurring theme cited by sur-
veyed and interviewed experts. 
Both developing countries and many 
smaller states around the world are 
seen to be in the position of ‘price-tak-
ers’ – i.e., they must accept prevailing 
solutions and approaches from larger 
countries, without providing mean-
ingful input. One interviewed expert 
suggested that this leads to a feeling 
of technological colonization, which 
causes particular resentment in coun-
tries with a colonial history. 
While this point is raised in various 
contexts throughout the Report, it 
should certainly be considered in the 
examination of current approaches 
to solutions. It is important to assess 
not only how well these approaches 
work in the countries at the forefront 
of internet technologies, but how they 
impact developing and smaller coun-
tries, as well. Further, it is not enough 
to consider how well these approaches 
to solutions work today. It is also nec-
essary to consider how they will work 
in the future, when the online environ-
ment is even more diverse.
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Major technical approaches to solutions
4 . 2
Many of the legal issues that arise in 
the context of internet technology 
may also be solved through that same 
technology. This section describes 
and examines the role of particularly 
significant technical approaches to 
solutions impacting the cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet. A 
theme uniting many of these technical 
approaches is that they focus on lim-
iting access to content. 
The first technical approach to solu-
tions – the use of so-called geo-loca-
tion technologies – is currently a major 
‘battle ground’. The survey carried out 
for this Report sheds light on a diver-
gence of views on geo-location tech-
nologies among the Internet & Juris-
diction Policy Network’s stakeholders. 
Other technical measures aimed at 
limiting access to content include:
•  Content filtering on the national 
network level;
•  Court ordered suspension, deletion, 
non-resolving, seizure and transfer 
in the context of the Domain Name 
System;
•  Court ordered DNS blocking, IP 
Address blocking or re-routing and 
URL blocking in the context of the 
Domain Name System;
•  Service shutdowns; and
•  Internet shutdowns.
All these technical blocking measur-
ers, at least in their current form, have 
the potential to be undermined, if not 
rendered useless, by the development 
of satellite-based internet connectiv-
ity such as the OneWeb81 project  and 
Iridium82, which provide satellite-based 
broadband connectivity worldwide.
The trend of forced data localization 
requirements is also examined, and at-
tention is given to the multifaceted im-
pact of artificial intelligence. 
Technological complexity poses an ob-
stacle to finding useful technical ap-
proaches to solutions to the cross-bor-
der legal challenges on the internet. 
Therefore, as in the context of legal 
approaches to solutions, there is a need 
for capacity building on every level. 
Technical capacity building is needed 
among both internet users and SMEs, 
as well as administrators, law enforce-
ment, courts, governments and other 
stakeholders. This need is particularly 
acute in developing countries, but it 
also exists at the highest levels in de-
veloped countries.83   
81.   https://www.oneweb.world/. 
82.   https://www.iridium.com/. 
83.   See e.g.: Farrell, H. (2018, December 5). Rudy Giuliani is Trump’s cybersecurity adviser. He might want a refresher. The Washington Post. 
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/05/rudy-giuliani-is-trumps-cybersecurity-adviser-he-might-
want-a-refresher/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.603492432f39, and BBC News. (2018, November 15). Japan’s cyber-security minister has ‘never used 
a computer’. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46222026. 
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The conceptual complexity prevents 
informed participation for many stake-
holders, and frequently results in mis-
understanding and miscommunication. 
Many concepts must be agreed upon 
(and understood) in order to fos-
ter a productive discussion of the 
cross-border legal challenges faced 
on the internet. Complicating matters 
further is the fact that these concepts 
are often only properly understood 
when viewed in relation to other relat-
ed concepts. 
This section of the Report will highlight 
various relevant ‘concept clusters’, with 
the aim to both discuss a selection of 
concepts and illustrate how they relate 
to one another. Some key concepts – 
such as the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ – 
must be viewed in relation to several 
other concepts, and are thus discussed 
as part of several clusters.     
As noted in the Introduction, and as observed by 
interviewed and surveyed experts, progress on the 
cross-border legal challenges faced on the internet has 
been hindered, in part, by the insufficiency of the framework 
and concepts we use to address these challenges. The 
entire field suffers from an ‘artificial regulatory challenge’.
5.1  Public international law, private international law (or conflict of laws)
5.2  Sovereignty, jurisdiction and territory
5.3 Territorial, and extraterritorial, jurisdictional claims
5.4 Due diligence, duty of non-intervention and comity
5.5  Legislative jurisdiction, adjudicative jurisdiction, investigative jurisdiction  
and enforcement jurisdiction
5.6 Jurisdiction, choice of law, declining jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement
5.7 Personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and scope of jurisdiction
5.8 Technology neutral, functional equivalence, future proofing
5.9  Data types
5.10  Delist, deindex, de-reference, delete, block, remove, takedown, stay-down
5.11 Registry, registrar, gTLD and ccTLD
5.12 Internet, World Wide Web
5.13 B2B, B2C, and C2C
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cross-border nature of the internet and 
national jurisdictions. 
Its Secretariat facilitates a global policy process 
between key stakeholders to enable transnational 
cooperation and policy coherence. Participants in 
the Policy Network work together to preserve the 
cross-border nature of the Internet, protect human 
rights, fight abuses, and enable the global digital 
economy. Since 2012, the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Policy Network has engaged more than 200 key 
entities from different stakeholder groups around 
the world, including governments, the world’s largest 
Internet companies, the technical community, civil 
society groups, leading universities and international 
organizations.
